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Act CCVIII of 2011 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank defines the primary objective of Hungary’s central bank as to achieve and 
maintain of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function more effectively, contributes to higher economic 
growth over the longer term and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and employment.
In the inflation targeting system, since August 2005 the Bank has sought to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation 
rate near the 3 per cent medium-term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank, performs a comprehensive review of the expected developments in inflation every three months, in order 
to establish monetary conditions consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of 
careful consideration of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the 
inflation outlook, money and capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and to enhance transparency, the 
Bank publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report presents the 
inflation forecasts prepared by the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis, Financial Analysis and Financial Stability 
departments, as well as the macroeconomic developments underlying these forecasts. The Report is published quarterly. 
The forecasts produced by the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis departments are based on 
the assumption of endogenous monetary policy. In respect of economic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the 
forecasting rules used in previous issues of the Report are applied.
 
The analyses in this Report were prepared by staff in the MNB’s Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial 
Analysis departments and Financial Stability department. Chapters 1 to 4 and 6 and 7 were prepared under the general 
direction of Director Ágnes Csermely, while chapter 5 was prepared under the general direction of Director Áron Gereben. 
The project was managed by Barnabás Virág, Senior Economist of Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis. The Report 
was approved for publication by the Executive Board of the MNB.
Primary contributors to this Report include: Judit Antal, Dániel Baksa, Gergely Baksay, Péter Bauer, Tamás Berki, Iván 
Csaba, Gergely Fábián, Csaba Fehér, Péter Gábriel, Mihály Hoffmann, Ágnes Horváth, Emese Hudák, Zsuzsanna Hosszú, 
Johanna Jeney, Éva Kaponya, Zsuzsa Kékesi, Gábor P. Kiss, Norbert Kiss M., Regina Kiss, Tamás Kiss, Péter Koroknai, Balázs 
Krusper, Henrik Kucsera, Kristóf Lehmann, Rita Lénárt-Odorán, Zsolt Lovas, Miklós Lukács, Ádám Martonosi, Zsolt Oláh, 
Gábor Pellényi, Olivér Rácz, István Schindler, Gábor D. Soós, Lajos Tamás Szabó, Katalin Szilágyi, Béla Szörfi, Péter Szűcs, 
Bálint Tamási, Bernadetta Tóth, Lóránt Varga, Judit Várhegyi, Viktor Várpalotai, Balázs Vonnák, Edit Zsinka.
Other contributors to the analyses and forecasts in this Report include various staff members of the Monetary Strategy 
and Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis departments.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments. The projections and policy considerations, 
however, reflect the views of staff in the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis departments 
and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary Council or the MNB.
The projections are based on information available in the period to 19 September 2012.
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Monetary polICy over the paSt Quarter
Factors pointing in the direction of an easing and a tightening of monetary policy have been present simultaneously since 
the outset of the financial crisis. The sharp decline in and persistent weakness of domestic demand would warrant a 
reduction in interest rates. However, continued cost shocks to the price level prevented any sustained fall in inflation, and 
therefore a cautious approach to interest rate policy was warranted. The global financial market environment and 
unfavourable movements in domestic asset prices also limited the room for manoeuvre in monetary policy from time to 
time.
According to the Council’s assessment in June, the factors pointing to an increase or a reduction in interest rates offset 
each other. In its June press release, the Council had indicated that a cautious approach to monetary policy was warranted 
by the risk environment and inflation remaining persistently above target and that interest rates could only be reduced 
after upside risks to inflation subsided.
There has been a sharp deterioration in the outlook for both inflation and the economy over the past quarter. But the 
global financial market environment improved and, as a result, perceptions of the risks associated with Hungarian financial 
assets fell markedly. Considering these factors, the Council in August voted to reduce the policy rate by 25 basis points, 
after maintaining it in July. In its August press release, the Council had indicated that monetary policy could only be eased 
to the extent that supply shocks to the economy and the upward impact on prices of the Government’s measures did not 
lead to the build-up of second-round inflationary effects.
eConoMIC developMentS
Financial market sentiment has improved and the outlook for economic activity deteriorated around the world over the 
past quarter. Sentiment in international financial markets improved considerably in the summer months. Positive 
international investor sentiment mainly reflected announcements related to euro-area crisis management, but expectations 
about a new round of quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve also contributed to an increase in risk appetite. 
Despite the signs of improvement in financial markets, however, business survey indicators point to a further slowdown in 
most economic regions of the world; and there is a risk that the euro-area economy will fall back into recession this year. 
In the Monetary Council’s judgement, the actions taken by euro-area governments will live up to expectations over time 
and economic activity in Europe will pick up gradually from 2013.
The contrast between improved perceptions of risks and very subdued economic activity has been reflected in domestic 
economic developments recently. In the favourable international environment, premia on Hungarian financial assets fell 
markedly. However, the contraction in economic output continued in the second quarter, although less sharply than in the 
previous period. The decline in GDP reflected the effects of both external and domestic factors. Actions to reduce private 
and public debt accumulated during the pre-crisis period, tight lending conditions and the uncertain economic environment 
continue to act as a significant drag on domestic demand. Production picked up as the large investment projects in the 
the statement of the Monetary Council 
about the overview of economic 
developments and monetary policy 
assessment
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automotive industry were completed, but the slowdown in Hungary’s external markets offset some of the expansionary 
effect of new capacities on exports. The extremely poor harvest results in agriculture are likely to cause a further 
deterioration in the outlook for growth this year.
In the Monetary Council’s judgement, the outlook for domestic economic growth has deteriorated recently and output is 
expected to grow only slowly in 2013. Exports will remain the main driving force behind growth, supported by the 
expected recovery in activity in Europe. Domestic demand will remain persistently weak, reflecting falling real incomes, 
continued balance sheet adjustment and tight lending conditions. Consumption and investment are likely to continue to 
decline next year. As a result of persistently high unemployment and low investment activity, the potential growth of the 
economy is likely to remain weak next year.
Labour market activity has strengthened recently, reflecting the effects of measures taken by the Government over the 
past few years. However, corporate demand for labour remained low as economic activity continued to weaken, with the 
Government’s public work programmes being the only source of growth in employment. Earnings growth has picked up 
sharply this year after being subdued in previous years. The administrative wage increases at the beginning of the year 
were an important factor contributing to the pick-up in earnings growth; however, the wage inflation indicators rose, even 
after excluding the effect of the minimum wage increase. The introduction of the wage compensation scheme for 
companies has temporarily reduced upward pressure on costs from strong earnings growth; however, rising unit labour 
costs, associated with deteriorating sales opportunities, have led to cost-push inflationary pressures and restrained 
employment growth, particularly in sectors producing for the domestic market. The Monetary Council will closely monitor 
developments in the factors driving the recent sharp increase in earnings growth.
The Monetary Council’s view is that the increase in unemployment during the crisis reflected in part permanent, structural 
problems; however, even taking this factor into account, slack in the labour market is likely to remain in the period ahead. 
With the outlook for economic activity remaining weak, growth in demand for labour is expected to be slow. Therefore, 
nominal earnings growth may moderate as the effects of the minimum wage increase wear off. The job protection action 
plan, to be implemented next year, is likely to result in a reduction in the employment costs of employees affected by the 
programme. In the Monetary Council’s judgement, the measures will be sufficient only to cushion the effects of weak 
activity, and private sector employment is likely to grow at a subdued pace at best.
As the outlook for growth deteriorated, the annual consumer price index remained persistently close to the levels seen at 
the beginning of the year. High inflation reflects, in part, the effects of the increase in indirect taxes by the Government 
and the unfolding food price shock. Other measures of inflation, which exclude these effects and capture underlying 
inflation developments, also rose, with the pass-through of cost shocks into prices being greater than previously expected. 
Looking ahead, the unfolding food price shock and new government measures are likely to cause the consumer price index 
to remain at an elevated level through higher excise duties and rises in companies’ production costs. Rising labour costs, 
increases in taxes on production and higher commodity prices, as well as the downward impact of weak demand on prices 
all play a role in shaping developments in underlying inflation.
In aggregate, inflation (i.e. the annual rate of increase of consumer prices) is expected to remain significantly above the 
3 per cent target for most of the forecast period, with the target only likely to be met in the second half of 2014.
In the Monetary Council’s view, Hungary’s external financing capacity may continue to increase in the coming years. The 
improvement in the country’s external balance reflects rising EU transfers, in addition to the continuous increase in the 
surplus on the balance of goods and services; however, the deficit on the income account has been increasing. The 
investment projects in the automotive industry brought into production will make a significant contribution to growth in 
net exports, while weak demand will contribute to the high goods surplus through lower imports.
While meeting the deficit target, fiscal policy is likely to bear down on domestic demand this year and next. Although the 
measures announced as part of the job protection programme have led to a significant amount of fiscal easing in the 2013 
government balance, the Monetary Council assumes that the Government will remain committed to meeting the deficit 
targets, and therefore expects fiscal adjustment to continue. The measures included in the technical assumptions of the 
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THE STATEMENT OF THE MONETARy COUNCIL
projection are likely to raise the consumer price index in 2013 while restraining demand; however, they are necessary to 
achieve a gradual reduction in Hungary’s risk premia.
A sustainable decline in the fiscal deficit is key to the further reduction in government debt. The Monetary Council 
continues to consider it crucial that an agreement between the Government and the European Union and the International 
Monetary Fund is reached as soon as possible in order to reduce the risks associated with financing the government debt 
and ensure that risk premia fall.
Monetary polICy ConSIderatIonS 
The outlook for the economy and, consequently, the room for manoeuvre in monetary policy are surrounded by a 
significant degree of uncertainty. The Council’s monetary policy actions are influenced mainly by the future outlook for 
inflation, the position of the economy in the current cycle and by perceptions of the risks associated with the economy.
In the Council’s assessment, the economy’s production capacities may have been damaged and the rate of potential 
economic growth fell significantly as the crisis dragged on. Even as growth remained weak, the output gap closed gradually 
during the crisis. There is uncertainty in the Monetary Council about the extent to which existing spare capacity in the 
economy is able to restrain increases in labour costs and prices. Developments in underlying inflation and rises in wages 
suggest that the disinflationary impact of subdued demand may have weakened recently. However, a number of factors 
contributed to increases in wages and inflation, and therefore it is difficult to distinguish demand-pull effects form cost-
push effects. Consequently, the role of permanent and cyclical factors in the economic downturn can be determined only 
with a considerable degree of uncertainty. If supply capacity is damaged to a smaller extent, then the disinflationary 
impact of weak economic activity is greater, and the inflation target can be met by maintaining looser monetary 
conditions.
Another important question in terms of monetary policy decisions is the extent to which continued cost shocks to the 
economy alter economic agents’ inflation expectations. If agents expect inflation to remain persistently higher, then the 
second-round effects of the cost shock may be stronger, nominal wages may increase and underlying inflation may rise. 
In that case, tighter monetary conditions are necessary to offset unfavourable developments.
Changes in the financial market environment may also have a significant influence on monetary policy decisions. In terms 
of future developments in risk perceptions, the Monetary Council judges that there is a chance of both an improvement 
and a deterioration in the current situation. Greater-than-expected success in European crisis management and domestic 
economic policy measures to mitigate the risks to debt financing may help reduce risk premia. However, a failure or 
significant delay in reaching an agreement between Government and the European Commission and the IMF may lead to 
a sharp rise in risk premia.
A majority of Monetary Councils members judge that there continues to be a significant margin of spare capacity in the 
economy. Therefore, weak domestic demand dampens the direct inflationary impact of cost shocks. The inflation target 
is likely to be met as the direct effects of cost shocks wear off. The measures to address the European sovereign debt 
crisis will contribute significantly to the improvement in the global financial market environment, which in turn will result 
in a sustained fall in domestic risk premia. Overall, expected developments in inflation and financial markets as well as 
persistently weak demand warrant an easing of current monetary conditions. The Council will consider a further reduction 
in interest rates if the improvement in financial market sentiment persists and medium-term upside risks to inflation 
remain moderate.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Summary table of baseline scenario
(our forecast is based on endogenous monetary policy)
2011 2012 2013
fact projection
Inlation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.7 5.2 4.9
Core inflation without indirect tax effects 2.5 2.7 3.1
Consumer price index 3.9 5.8 5.0
economic growth
External demand (GDP based)2 2.7 0.7 1.3
Household consumption expenditure 0.0 −1.0 −0.8
Gross fixed capital formation −5.5 −5.9 0.0
Domestic absorption −0.6 −3.1 −1.0
Export 8.4 2.1 6.9
Import 6.3 0.6 5.8
GDP 1.6 −1.4 0.7
external balance
Current account balance 1.4 2.1 3.6
External financing capacity 3.5 4.7 6.7
Government balance3
ESA balance 4.2 −3.7 (−2.8) −2.7 (−2.4)*
labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4, 7 5.0 4.4 4.6
Whole-economy employment5 0.8 1.2 0.8
Private sector gross average earnings6 5.4 7.3 4.8
Private sector employment5 2.3 −0.2 0.5
Unit labour costs in the private sector5, 7 6.7 5.2 4.8
Household real income8 2.2 −4.0 −1.3
1 From May 2009 on, calculated according to the joint methodology of the CSO and MNB.
2 In line with the changes in Hungarian export structure by destination countries we revised the weights in our external demand indicator. 
3 As a percentage of GDP. Data in parenthesis include cancellation of free central reserves.
4 Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
5 According to the CSO LFS data corrected by fostered workers.
6 According to the original CSO data for full-time employees.
7 Private sector unit labour costs calculated with a wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
8  MNB estimate. In our current forecast we have corrected the data of household income with the effect of changes in net equity because of payments 
into mandatory private pension funds.
*  In our baseline forecast we assumed a hypothetical fiscal adjustment that is consistent with the Government’s intentions set out in the Convergence 
Programme of Hungary. The size of the assumed adjustment is equal with the size of fiscal stimulus (+1,4% of GDP) was announced in July 2012.
Quarterly report on inflation • September 2012 11
The staff forecast is founded on an endogenous interest rate path and is based on the Monetary Policy Model developed 
by the MNB.1 In the model, the reactions of monetary policy are predominantly influenced by the deviations of inflation 
expected over the time horizon relevant for monetary policy from the medium-term inflation target and by our picture of 
the cyclical position of the economy. Staff calibrated the sensitivity of the reaction function to individual variables on the 
basis of past decisions of the Monetary Council and international experiences. The forecasts of the staff are based on 
assumptions in a number of areas. Considering that the applied assumptions are surrounded by a high degree of 
uncertainty, the Council also takes into account further information, in addition to the results of the model. Accordingly, 
the interest rate path implied by the model may provide valuable information for the decisions of the Monetary Council, 
although it does not necessarily coincide with the decisions of the Council at all times.
1  For more details on the model, see Chapter 6.1 of the March 2011 issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation and the following study: Ágnes HorvÁtH, 
Csaba Köber and Katalin szilÁgyi (2011), MPM − The Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s monetary policy model, MNB Bulletin, June.
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Due to external and domestic factors, macroeconomic developments have been characterised by deteriorating business 
conditions and rising inflation in recent months. Despite the deteriorating demand environment, inflation data proved to 
be higher than our expectations. The dual trends of weak growth and high inflation may prevail over the majority of the 
forecast horizon, while the risk assessment of the Hungarian economy may become more favourable than we assumed in 
June. The effects of the government measures for meeting the fiscal targets and the cost shocks that occurred last quarter 
will keep inflation persistently above the target next year as well. Inflation is expected to sink to below 3 per cent in 2014 
H2. The steadily high inflation points to the tightening of monetary policy conditions, while the persistently weak economic 
growth and the decline in the risk premium on domestic assets would call for easing. These effects offset each other over 
the majority of the baseline scenario. Accordingly, our forecast assumes that the actual level of the interested rate is 
maintained for a longer period.
In early 2012, the Hungarian economy fell into recession, and only moderate economic growth is expected for next year as 
well. Weak real economic performance partly reflects the slowdown in global economic activity and partly the impact of 
domestic factors. Hungary’s external demand may pick up from the end of the year again, but growth may continue to be 
restrained in the following years as well, due to the protracted crisis management of developed economies. Nevertheless, 
Hungary’s growth will continue to rely on exports. Domestic demand will remain persistently weak, due to the declining 
real income, the protracted balance sheet adjustment and the generally tight credit supply. Due to the uncertain demand 
outlook and regulatory risks that weaken investors’ confidence, corporate investment activity will continue to be weak. 
Against the background of persistently restrained investment activity, potential economic growth may have continued to 
decline this year, and no shift is expected in the coming years either. Our forecast suggests that Hungary’s growth will be 
increasingly influenced by cyclical effects. Accordingly, output will fall short of its potential level over the entire forecast 
horizon.
Corporate sector labour demand may remain persistently subdued, owing to the weak economic activity and unfavourable 
profitability. The job protection programme of the Government may primarily help to retain the existing jobs, and 
therefore − following this year’s slight decline − employment in the private sector may only grow at a subdued rate in 2013 
as well. Although unemployment remains steadily high, this partly reflects structural factors, and therefore the wage-
reducing effect of loose labour market conditions may diminish. As a result of administrative measures, nominal wage 
growth accelerated considerably this year. Due to these high wage dynamics and deteriorating economic activity, unit 
labour costs continued to rise. Government compensation measures may offset the cost-increasing effects of administrative 
measures over the short run, but over the long run the high unit labour costs may result in inflation risks, especially in 
labour-intensive sectors.
Data in recent months showed higher-than-expected inflation. The acceleration in inflation was primarily attributable to 
the first-round effects of commodity price increases, although − in spite of the weak demand − stronger-than-expected 
price increases were observed in the measure of core inflation as well. Core inflation remained at the level observed early 
in the year, indicating that the price-reducing effect of subdued demand may have weakened to some extent. Despite 
deteriorating growth prospects, global commodity prices have increased significantly in recent months. As a result of 
globally weak harvest results, agricultural product prices increased especially strongly. The increase in commodity prices 
first adds to the prices of non-core inflation items, before then gradually appearing in core inflation as well. Against the 
background of a negative output gap over the entire forecast horizon, no major second-round effects are expected. 
Inflation may well exceed 3 per cent for a significant part of the forecast period, and may be in line with the inflation 
target only in 2014.
1  Inflation and real economy outlook
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The net external financing capacity of the Hungarian economy may continue to increase in the coming years. The 
improvement in Hungary’s external balance position is attributable to the continuously growing surplus on the balance of 
goods and services as well as to increasing inflows of EU transfers. Against the background of sustained high external 
financing capacity, the large net external debt − a major source of vulnerability in recent years − may continue to 
decrease.
The steadily high inflation and weak economic growth would call for opposite interest rate paths, while the decline in the 
risk premium on domestic assets considerably expanded the room for manoeuvre in monetary policy in recent months. 
Although in our baseline scenario persistently weak demand and the improvement of the risk assessment point to the 
easing of monetary policy conditions, the considerable deterioration in inflation outlook does not allow for the easing of 
monetary policy conditions. Accordingly, our forecast assumes that the actual level of the interested rate is maintained 
for a longer period.
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Global financial market sentiment improved considerably in 
the summer months. Investors’ optimism was mainly borne 
by announcements related to the management of the 
European crisis, but the expectations of further quantitative 
easing by the Fed also contributed to an increase in risk 
tolerance. Despite the improving financial market 
developments, the most important business cycle indicators 
point to further deceleration in growth in most economic 
regions (Chart 1-1). Following the slow recovery in recent 
years, the euro area may slip into recession this year again, 
while signs of economic slowdown are being seen in 
emerging economies as well, after buoyant growth in 
earlier years. Global commodity prices are increasing in 
spite of the deteriorating growth prospects, which points to 
stronger cost-side inflationary effects.
The dual trends of improving risk perceptions and restrained 
real economy performance were observed in domestic 
developments as well. With stronger capital flows to 
emerging countries, the risk assessment of Hungary also 
improved considerably. In this favourable financial market 
atmosphere, the EUR/HUF exchange rate appreciated 
steadily to the range of 280-285 forints.
Following a significant fall in Q1, the decline in Hungarian 
economic output continued in Q2 as well, albeit to a lesser 
extent (Chart 1-2). Although demand-side inflationary 
pressure remained subdued, the annual consumer price 
index was steadily close to the high level observed early in 
the year. The increase in annual inflation experienced in 
recent months has been caused mainly by the rise in 
1.1  Situation assessment − starting position of 
the economy
Economic data for the past months were dominated by the dual trends of improving financial market sentiment and 
weakening prospects for economic activity. Increasing global risk tolerance considerably improved the risk perceptions of 
emerging markets, including that of the Hungarian economy. Despite the financial market optimism, the factors 
determining growth continued to be weak and resulted in a standstill or reversal of recent years’ slow growth both globally 
and in the Hungarian economy. In parallel with the weak demand outlook, no major shift was experienced in the labour 
market. High unemployment data partly reflect structural factors, and therefore labour market conditions may be less 
loose than previously expected. In line with this, the wage-reducing effect of high unemployment is smaller. Although 
demand side inflationary pressure continued to be subdued, the price-reducing effect of weak demand may have 
weakened. Besides this, the first-round effects of the increase in unprocessed food prices and the latest indirect tax 
increase in the course of the year also contributed considerably to the pick-up in inflation seen in recent months. Annual 
inflation remained steadily close to the high level observed early in the year. Tax-adjusted inflation also exceeded the 3 
per cent target to some extent. 
Chart 1-1
Change in the vIX and Ifo indicators that present emerging 
market's business climate 
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INFLATION AND REAL ECONOMy OUTLOOK
unprocessed food prices and the latest excise tax increases 
that entered into force in the middle of the year. At the 
same time, the stagnation in underlying inflation since the 
beginning of the year underlines the declining disinflationary 
effect of weak demand.
Both domestic and external factors contributed to the 
continued decline in GDP. The reduction in private and 
government debt accumulated prior to the crisis, the 
generally tight lending conditions and the uncertain 
economic environment are restraining domestic demand. As 
planned, the Mercedes factory launched production around 
mid-year, but the slowdown in Hungary’s external markets 
reduced the export-stimulating impact of the new 
capacities. The extremely poor harvest results may 
exacerbate the decline in households’ real income this year, 
via falling incomes from agriculture.
According to the statistics of the Labour Force Survey, 
employment also increased during the summer months, in 
parallel with a continued increase in activity. In our 
opinion, the expansion of employment is mainly attributable 
to the public work programmes, while private sector labour 
demand continued to be restrained. This is indicated by the 
fact that institutions’ workforce figures, which show a 
closer co-movement with economic cycles, reflected a 
slight decline in the past months. Although unemployment 
has been declining in the past months, it is still high; in our 
opinion this can be linked increasingly to structural factors. 
In line with this, the wage-reducing effect of high 
unemployment may have weakened since the crisis. As a 
result of the administrative pay rises early in the year, wage 
outflows in the private sector accelerated considerably, 
which − accompanied by the decline in productivity − led to 
an increase in unit labour cost (Chart 1-3). The introduction 
of the wage compensation system diminishes the cost-
increasing effects of the high growth in wages over the 
short run, but as this effect fades, cost pressure on inflation 
may rise, especially in labour-intensive sectors.
The increase in consumer prices accelerated in the summer 
months. Annual inflation rose to nearly 6 per cent (Chart 
1-4). The effect of indirect tax increases implemented by 
the Government continues to be a determinant of the 
inflation rate, which is high in international comparison, but 
inflation excluding tax effects also exceeded the medium-
term target. Inflationary pressure from the demand side 
continues to be modest. The prices of consumer durables 
are declining, while − disregarding the tax effect − market 
services continue to be characterised by restrained price 
increases. At the same time, the strong exchange rate 
depreciation at the end of last year was reflected in price 
increases for several core inflation items (non-durable 
Chart 1-3
Wage growth in the private and public sectors
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Inflation developments
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goods, processed foods). The poor harvest results led to a 
strong price increase of unprocessed foods, the direct 
effects of which were already reflected in the figures for 
recent months. Commodity price increases will entail more 
intense general cost-side inflationary effects in the autumn 
months, which may be offset by a stronger EUR/HUF 
exchange rate.
In a deteriorating demand environment, the economy 
continues to be characterised by significant free capacities. 
At the same time, unemployment remains at a high level 
and investment activity remains persistently low, underlining 
the structural causes of the subdued economic performance 
as well. Against the background of a slower-than-expected 
growth in potential output, the disinflationary effect of 
subdued demand is somewhat weaker than our earlier 
estimates, which may have appeared in the stronger price 
increase of processed foods and non-durable goods. The 
output gap, which has been narrowing gradually since 2010, 
may widen again this year due to both domestic and 
external factors. Accordingly, with a stronger exchange 
rate, the disinflationary effect of the real economy may 
also help to offset the inflationary effects of rising raw 
material costs (Chart 1-5).
In 2012 H1, the annual indices of both gross average earnings and 
regular earnings increased considerably in the competitive sector. 
The assessment of wage developments is made difficult by the 
fact that wage dynamics are greatly influenced by the 
administrative measures entering into force this year, which may 
have had different effects on wage payments depending on wage 
levels. This box quantifies the effect of administrative measures 
on the wage index. A more precise determination of the effect 
may provide a more refined picture of the underlying wage 
developments.
Examining the employed broken down by sectors as well as by 
blue-collar and white-collar jobs we found that the wage index of 
those who earn more than HUF 200 thousand per month on 
average is markedly different from the wage index of those who 
earn less than HUF 200 thousand per month on average (Chart 
1-6). 
The administrative measures (mandatory minimum wage and 
guaranteed wage minimum increase, recommended wage increase 
bands necessary for recourse to wage compensation) primarily 
affected those who earn less than HUF 200 thousand per month. The very high (around 10 per cent) wage indices experienced in this 
group are primarily attributable to this effect. Although the measures entered into force already as of January, the majority of 
Box 1-1
the effect of administrative measures on the wage index of the private sector
Chart 1-6
Changes in wages for groups earning above and below 
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companies that employ more than 50 people implemented the 
necessary wage increases only in May. This may be attributable to 
the fact that the application deadline for the wage compensation 
expired in May, and the expected wage increases were allowed to 
be paid retroactively as well.
Meanwhile, wage increases in the higher income category were 
around 5 per cent this year. This increase also represented an 
acceleration in wages compared to 2011. In the case of employees 
with above-average wages, the wage acceleration against the 
backdrop of declining productivity may call attention to the 
weaker wage-reducing effect of labour market slack. The 
underlying reason is that high unemployment could increasingly 
be explained by structural problems.
Companies may offset the cost increasing effect of high wage 
costs through several channels. Therefore, a more refined picture 
of the developments in total labour cost can only be obtained 
after the analysis of these factors. 
Decomposing total labour costs into the effects of regular 
earnings, bonuses and other labour income as well as wage 
compensation leads to the conclusion that, in addition to the wide recourse to the wage compensation, companies mostly tried to cut 
their wage costs by reducing fringe benefits (Chart 1-7). To date, adjustment has been weak in the case of bonuses but the exact 
measurement of this adjustment channel will become possible only at the end of this year when the majority of bonuses are paid.
Using a time series estimation technique similar to methodology applied in VAT pass-through estimations, the effect of administrative 
wage increases may be close to 4 percentage points in this year’s wage index in the private sector. It is important to note that, in 
addition to direct effects, this figure may also include wage increases that were implemented by companies already as indirect effects 
of the administrative measures (e.g. cushioning of the wage congestion around the average wage). The effect of wage increases 
implemented directly only due to the administrative measures may be closer to the value of around 2.5 per cent, calculated as the 
quotient of the wage compensation utilised and the total wage bill.
Overall, in our opinion, developments underlying corporate waging may be characterised by annual dynamics of around 5 per cent, 
excluding the administrative measures. These dynamics are somewhat higher than in previous years, and against the background of 
deteriorating productivity they resulted in an increase in unit labour costs this year.
Chart 1-7
decomposition of the change in total wage cost 
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Our baseline scenario for inflation is determined by the 
significant increase in commodity prices, the accelerating 
labour costs increase, the latest government measures and 
the effects of persistently weak demand (Chart 1-8).
In recent months, despite the global economic slowdown 
and the deterioration in the prospects for business activity, 
an increase in global commodity prices has been observed. 
The spring decline in oil prices proved to be temporary. 
Food prices also rose significantly, as a result of the 
unfavourable weather. Commodity price increases appear in 
consumer prices at different paces. Energy price increases 
result in an immediate rise in domestic fuel prices, whereas 
a food price shock adds to the inflation of unprocessed 
food. Over the short term, it is mainly the prices of non-
core inflation items which are expected to increase. From 
the autumn months, the increase in costs will be reflected 
in rising core inflation as well. Higher energy prices are 
generally incorporated into production costs, whereas the 
increase in unprocessed food prices mainly passes through 
into processed food prices.
In addition to commodity price increases, higher unit labour 
cost may imply an increase in inflation as well. Although 
nominal wage dynamics may be restrained again as of 2013 
as the effects of the minimum wage increase have faded, 
the higher wage level will result in a rise in wage costs. The 
resulting effects will be considerably dampened by the 
Government’s compensation measures over the short run, 
but companies may face accelerating unit labour cost 
increases in the persistently weak demand environment. 
The increase in labour costs may strengthen cost-side 
inflationary effects, especially in the case of labour-
intensive sectors.
1.2  Inflation forecast
Inflation may significantly exceed the 3 per cent inflation target for most of the forecast period. Weak domestic demand 
restrains inflation over the entire forecast horizon, but the commodity price shocks will result in strong cost-side 
inflationary pressure. The food price shock adds to the inflation of non-core inflation items over the short run and will 
gradually pass through into core inflation as well starting from the end of this year. In addition to the cost-side effects, 
further government measures will also add to the 2013 consumer price index due to increases in excise taxes and the 
rationalisation of price subsidies. In the baseline scenario, against the background of a weak demand environment, the 
cost shocks are not expected to result in permanent feed-through effects. Accordingly, inflation will return to the target 
in 2014 H2, as these shocks gradually fade.
Chart 1-8
fan chart of the inflation forecast
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In 2013, further government measures (reduction of 
pharmaceutical subsidies, telephone tax, single insurance 
tax, financial transaction tax, introduction of electronic 
road toll) will also contribute to rising inflation. Some of the 
measures result in consumer price increases in the short 
run already. Some of them appear in the consumer prices 
only gradually, through increases in corporate production 
costs (Chart 1-9).
Core inflation excluding tax changes may amount to around 
3 per cent in 2013. The price-reducing effect of weak 
demand will prevail over the entire forecast horizon. 
Accordingly, as the effect of cost shocks and fiscal measures 
fade, no major second-round effects are expected. Core 
inflation may follow a declining trend again (Chart 1-10). As 
a result of all these factors, inflation may be well above 3 
per cent this year and in 2013 as well, and may be in line 
with the inflation target only in 2014, at the end of the 
forecast period.
Chart 1-10
forecast for core inflation and non-core inflation 
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table 1-1
details of the inflation forecast
2011 2012 2013
Core inflation 2.7 5.2 4.9
non-core inflation
Unprocessed food 4.3 6.1 4.9
Gasoline and market energy 13.8 12.3 2.8
Regulated prices 4.0 5.1 6.4
Total 6.4 7.1 5.2
Consumer price index 3.9 5.8 5.0
According to our expectations, most of the fiscal adjustment planned by the Government may be implemented, and the deficit may 
be below 3 per cent in 2012. At the same time, the measures announced in the past quarter will result in a considerable easing in the 
2013 budget. Compared to our forecast in the June issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation, there was a fiscal easing amounting to 
more than 1 per cent of GDP, which is largely attributable to the fiscal deficit effect of the job protection action plan and the new 
form of the transaction tax. Based on the fiscal measures known at present, in 2013 the 3 per cent deficit will probably be exceeded 
considerably, which − in our opinion − contrasts with the Government’s commitment to deficit targets. Therefore, our forecast is based 
on the technical assumption that in the future the Government will neutralise the deficit increasing effect of the measures taken in 
the past period. Accordingly, along our technical assumption we expect a hypothetical adjustment that is based on expenditure and 
revenue side measures on a fifty-fifty basis. Along this path, with a fiscal adjustment of 1.4 per cent as a proportion of GDP, next year’s 
deficit may be reduced to 2.4 per cent of GDP, which corresponds to our earlier forecast.
Box 1-2
technical forecast assumptions regarding the package of measures ensuring the attainability of the deficit target
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In 2012 H1, the Hungarian economy entered into recession, 
from which it may recover gradually during the forecast 
period. Both external and domestic factors played a role in 
the economic downturn in 2012. International economic 
activity weakened significantly, due to the protracted debt 
crisis in the euro area and the problems facing the European 
banking system. Domestic demand continues to be subdued 
as a result of households’ unfavourable income position, the 
uncertain economic environment, tight lending conditions 
and government measures aiming at improving the fiscal 
balance. All these factors may result in a major decline in 
GDP, and only subdued growth is expected for next year as 
well (Chart 1-11).
The international environment was determined by the dual 
trends of improving financial market sentiment and 
deteriorating macroeconomic prospects. While global risk 
tolerance increased, the prospects for business activity of 
Hungary’s trading partners deteriorated in recent months. 
Tensions within the euro area are expected to be successfully 
resolved, and the demand-reducing effect of government 
measures to restore fiscal balance is expected to decline 
gradually. As a result, euro-area growth may pick up again 
from the second half of this year, although the rate of 
growth will be much lower than observed before the crisis. 
In line with developments in international economic 
activity, any major increase in Hungarian exports will 
probably take place only from 2013 (Chart 1-12). In our 
forecast, we expect some increase in the market share of 
Hungarian exports as a result of the development of new 
capacities in the automotive sector (Chart 1-13).
Although the factors determining the capacity of the 
banking sector to lend eased to some extent (mainly on the 
liquidity side), the deterioration in banks’ portfolio quality 
and in the prospects for business activity will result in a 
1.3  real economy outlook
According to our forecast, Hungarian economic output will decline this year and will probably only grow slowly in 2013 as 
well. Growth continues to be driven by exports, but expansion in this field is also expected to be slower than in the past, 
due to the deteriorating prospects for international economic activity. Domestic demand is likely remain persistently 
subdued. Consumption and investment may continue to decline both this year and next as a result of domestic agents’ 
protracted balance sheet adjustments, tight lending conditions and the uncertain economic environment. With 
unemployment remaining at a high level and investment activity persistently slack, potential economic growth will likely 
remain subdued over the entire forecast horizon.
Chart 1-11
fan chart of the Gdp forecast 
(based on seasonally adjusted and reconciled data, 2008 Q2−2014 Q3)
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decline in willingness to take risks, and consequently in a 
strengthening of supply constraints. Lending conditions are 
expected to tighten in the corporate segment in the future 
as well, which may also be exacerbated by the passing on 
of the financial transaction tax as of 2013. Due to weak 
economic activity, credit demand will also be subdued. 
Accordingly, our overall forecast picture regarding the 
developments in corporate lending has deteriorated. The 
negative effects prevailing in the household segment as 
well (continued balance sheet adjustment, worsening 
income position) may be offset by the slow easing of the 
tight credit conditions resulting from early repayments. This 
easing may be supported by the demand stimulating effect 
of the state interest rate subsidy programme as well (for 
more details, see Box 1-3). Overall, developments in lending 
to the private sector have deteriorated since the previous 
Quarterly Report on Inflation; no significant increase is 
expected in the household or corporate segments over our 
forecast horizon (Chart 1-15).
Households’ real income may continue to fall in parallel 
with inflation remaining at a high level and low labour 
demand. In the coming quarters, consumption may continue 
to slacken as a result of declining real incomes and tight 
lending conditions. Against the background of uncertain 
economic prospects, precautionary considerations may 
continue to be strong; therefore, the net savings rate may 
remain at a permanently high level compared to pre-crisis 
years (Chart 1-14).
Looking ahead, whole-economy investment will be 
stimulated only by public investment financed from EU 
funds, while private investment may continue to decline. 
Corporate investment is limited by the deteriorating 
prospects for business activity, tight lending conditions and 
the growing tax burden of the corporate sector. The 
historically low corporate investment rate affects the 
growth potential of the economy as well. Households’ 
investment in real estate is limited by the decline in real 
incomes and low lending activity as well.
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Chart 1-15
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At end-2011, the Government introduced a ‘home-creation’ interest rate subsidy scheme to ease the acquisition of housing and the 
refinancing of problem loans. Any private person may have recourse to this interest subsidy: until end-2014 for building and buying new 
homes as well as for purchasing used ones, and until end-2012 for purchasing properties with mortgage default, or for defaulting 
debtors’ moving into smaller homes as well as for refinancing of non-performing foreign currency loans. The interest rate subsidy is 
available for five years and its extent declines gradually year by year. Furthermore, the extent of the subsidy varies according to the 
purpose of use and other conditions as well (Table 1-2)
Upon introduction of the programme in 2011, the applied interest rate that can be charged under the scheme concerned was 
maximised. It is calculated by adding 3 percentage points to the benchmark government securities yields, which meant 10–11 per cent 
under the terms of 2012 H1. However, the maximised offer price proved to be low compared to the risks: the highest chargeable 
interest rate was 2–3 percentage points below the average of the market housing loan conditions advertised in 2012 H1, and thus no 
product appeared in banks’ supply could be utilised with state subsidy. In order to fill in this gap, an amendment to the relevant law 
made the conditions more favourable in July 2012: the maximum chargeable interest rate was raised to 130 per cent of the reference 
yield + 3 percentage points. As a result, the upper limit for the subsidised scheme increased to the level of lending rates under the 
current market conditions, i.e. to around 12 per cent; of which the interest rate reduced by the subsidy and to be paid by the customer 
is 9 per cent on average during the period of the subsidy (but it changes annually in line with the extent of the interest rate subsidy).
Accordingly, the effective forint interest rate to be paid by customers in the period of the subsidy is close to the levels prevailing in 
2010, and it is expected to result in an increase in new disbursements. Consequently, the interest rate subsidy programme may 
contribute to a pick-up in the market of housing loans, which slowed down extremely following the period of early repayments, 
however, only to a moderate extent over the short term. On the one hand, although this measure stimulates demand for credit, it 
cannot counterbalance the negative effect of the weak income position of households, which essentially influences lending 
developments in this sector. On the other hand, new disbursements will be partly related to refinancing, and thus the scheme will 
result in effective new lending only to a lesser extent. Therefore, the scheme’s impact on GDP growth is expected to remain moderate.
Box 1-3
Impact of the new state interest rate subsidy scheme on our lending forecast
table 1-2
the most important conditions of the ‘home-creation’ interest rate subsidy
purpose of application
Market 
value limit 
(million 
huf)
Credit 
limit 
(million 
huf)
other conditions
extent of subsidy* (per cent)
1st yr 2nd yr 3rd yr 4th yr 5th yr
Building or buying new 
homes
30 10
Additional 10 ppt. 
in case of 3 or 
more children
60 55 50 45 40
Purchasing used homes, 
renovation
15 6
Purchasing at 
latest in 1 year
50 45 40 35 30
Purchasing property with 
mortgage default - 
Budapest
15 10 −
50 50 45 40 35
Purchasing property with 
mortgage default - other
10 7 −
Moving into smaller homes 
for defaulting debtors
less than 
the original
less than 
the 
outstanding
− 50 45 40 35 30
Refinancing non-performing 
FX loans - Budapest
20 − At least one child; 
only for contracts 
not terminated
50 45 40 35 30
Refinancing non-performing 
FX loans - other
15 −
* In proportion of the concerning benchmark yield.
Source: Government Decree No. 341/2011.
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The measures taken by the Government aiming at the 
expansion of activity will result in a further increase in 
labour supply over the forecast horizon. However, corporate 
demand for labour may remain persistently low due to the 
weak economic activity and the strained profit situation of 
companies (Chart 1-16). Over the short run, the unfavourable 
effect of the minimum wage increase on employment may 
be reduced by the compensation provided by the 
Government. The job protection programme entering into 
force next year will considerably reduce the costs of 
employment of the employees concerned, softening the 
impact of weak economic activity on employment. Overall, 
following this year’s slight decline, employment in the 
private sector is expected to increase slightly in 2013.
As a result of the administrative pay rises, nominal wage 
growth accelerated considerably this year. The increase in 
unemployment observed during the crisis reflects 
permanent structural problems as well, but even taking 
account of this, the labour market environment may remain 
loose over the forecast period, keeping wage-setting under 
control. In addition, due to the lacklustre growth prospects, 
corporate profitability may be persistently weak, and 
therefore, nominal wage dynamics may be more restrained 
even after the effect of the nominal wage increase fades 
(Chart 1-17).
1.4  labour market forecast
In line with the government measures taken in recent years, growth in activity is expected to continue in the labour 
market. Corporate sector labour demand, however, may remain subdued due to the weak prospects for economic activity 
and the unfavourable profitability position of companies. Following this year’s slight decline, private sector employment 
will likely only grow at a subdued rate in 2013 as well. The growth in activity may mainly take place via the increase in 
public employment. Although the rise in unemployment is partly attributable to structural reasons, the labour market 
environment will continue to be loose. Accordingly, nominal wage growth will be more restrained after the effects of the 
nominal wage increase fade. At the same time, in the weak demand environment, with deterioration in productivity the 
higher wage level will result in a rapid increase in unit labour costs.
Chart 1-16
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Chart 1-17
employment and unemployment, total economy 
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table 1-3
Changes in our projections compared to the previous Inflation report
2011 2012 2013
fact
projection
June actual June actual
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.7 4.9 5.2 3.0 4.9
Core inflation without indirect tax effects 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.4 3.1
Consumer price index 3.9 5.3 5.8 3.5 5.0
economic growth
External demand (GDP-based)2 2.7 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.3
Household consumer expenditure 0.0 −1.0 −1.0 −0.5 −0.8
Government final consumption 
expenditure
−0.5 −3.4 −2.9 −2.9 −2.2
Fixed capital formation −5.5 −4.1 −5.9 0.0 0.0
Domestic absorption −0.6 −2.4 −3.1 −0.7 −1.0
Export 8.4 4.4 2.1 8.4 6.9
Import 6.3 3.1 0.6 7.5 5.8
GDP 1.6 −0.8 −1.4 0.8 0.7
external balance
Current account balance 1.4 2.8 2.1 4.0 3.6
External financing capacity 3.5 5.4 4.7 7.3 6.7
Government balance3
ESA balance 4.2 −3.6 (−2.7) −3.7 (−2.8) −2.8 (−2.4) −2.7 (−2.4)*
labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4, 7 5.0 3.8 4.4 3.6 4.6
Whole-economy employment5 0.8 0.9 1.2 0.2 0.8
Private sector gross average earnings6 5.4 6.3 7.3 4.1 4.8
Private sector employment5 2.3 −0.3 −0.2 0.0 0.5
Private sector unit labour cost5, 7 6.7 5.8 5.2 5.3 4.8
Household real income8 2.2 −3.2 −4.0 −0.9 −1.3
1 From May 2009 on, calculated according to the joint methodology of the CSO and MNB.
2 In line with the changes in Hungarian export structure by destination countries we revised the weights in our external demand indicator. 
3 As a percentage of GDP. Data in parenthesis include cancellation of free central reserves.
4 Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
5 June: according to the CSO LFS data, September: according to the CSO LFS data corrected by fostered workers.
6 According to the original CSO data for full-time employees.
7 Private sector unit labour costs calculated with a wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
8  MNB estimate. In our current forecast we have corrected the data of household income with the effect of changes in net equity because of payments 
into mandatory private pension funds.
*  In our baseline forecast we assumed a hypothetical fiscal adjustment that is consistent with the Government’s intentions set out in the Convergence 
Programme of Hungary. The size of the assumed adjustment is equal with the size of fiscal stimulus (+1,4% of GDP) was announced in July 2012. 
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table 1-4
MnB basic forecast compared to other forecasts
2012 2013 2014
Consumer price Index (annual average growth rate, %)
MNB (September 2012) 5.8 5.0 −
Consensus Economics (August 2012)1 5.3 − 5.6 − 6.1 2.5 − 3.9 − 6.2 3.2
European Commission (May 2012) 5.5 3.9 −
IMF (April 2012) 5.2 3.5 3.0
OECD (May 2012) 5.7 3.6 −
Reuters survey (September 2012)1 5.5 − 5.7 − 6.0 3.0 − 4.2 − 6.3 2.5 − 3.5 − 4.3
Gdp (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (September 2012) −1.4 0.7 −
Consensus Economics (August 2012)1 (−1.8) − (−1.1) − (−0.5) (−0.5) − (0.7) − (1.3) 2.2
European Commission (May 2012) −0.3 1.0 −
IMF (April 2012) 0.0 1.8 2.0
OECD (May 2012) −1.5 1.1 −
Reuters survey (September 2012)1 (−1.8) − (−1.0) − (−0.0) (−0.5) − (0.7) − (1.3) −
Current account balance (per cent of Gdp)
MNB (September 2012) 2.1 3.5 −
European Commission (May 2012) 2.2 3.7 −
IMF (April 2012) 3.3 1.8 −1.1
OECD (May 2012) 2.7 3.8 −
Budget Balance (eSa-95 method, per cent of Gdp)
MNB (September 2012)4 −3.7 (−2.8) −2.7 (−2.4)* −
Consensus Economics (August 2012)1 (−2.5) − (−2.9) − (−3.6) (−2.2) − (−2.8) − (−3.5) −
European Commission (May 2012) −2.5 −2.9 −
IMF (April 2012) −3.0 −3.4 −3.2
OECD (May 2012) −3.0 −2.9 −
Reuters survey (September 2012)1 (−2.5) − (−2.9) − (−3.5) (−2.5) − (−3.2) − (−3.9) −
forecasts on the size of hungary's export markets (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (September 2012) 0.7 3.5 −
European Commission (May 2012)2 2.1 4.8 −
IMF (April 2012)2 2.2 4.1 −
OECD (May 2012)2 2.5 5.0 −
forecasts on the Gdp growth rate of hungary's trade partners (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (September 2012) 0.7 1.3 −
Consensus Economics (August 2012)3 0.7 1.5 −
European Commission (May 2012)2 0.8 1.9 −
IMF (April 2012)² 0.9 1.9 −
OECD (May 2012)² 1.1 1.9 −
forecasts on the Gdp growth rate of euro area (annual growth rate, %)
Consensus Economics (September 2012)3 −0.5 0.2 −
European Commission (May 2012) −0.3 1.0 −
IMF (April 2012) −0.3 0.9 −
OECD (May 2012) −0.1 0.9 −
1  For Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys, in addition to the average value of the analysed replies (i.e. the medium value), we also indicate the 
lowest and the highest values to illustrate the distribution of the data.   
2  Values calculated by the MNB; the projections of the named institutions for the relevant countries are adjusted with the weighting system of the 
MNB, which is also used for the calculation of the bank’s own external demand indices. Certain institutions do not prepare forecast for all partner 
countries.   
3 Aggregate based on Euro area members included in our external demand indices.   
4  As a percentage of GDP. Data in parenthesis include cancellation of free central reserves.   
* In our baseline forecast we assumed a hypothetical fiscal adjustment that is consistent with the Government’s intentions set out in the Convergence 
Programme of Hungary. The size of the assumed adjustment is equal with the size of fiscal stimulus (+1,4% of GDP) was announced in July 2012.  
Sources: Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (Consensus Economics Inc. [London], August 2012); European Commission Economic Forecasts (May 2012); 
IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2012); Reuters survey (August 2012); OECD Economic Outlook, No. 91 (May 2012).
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In Hungary, the inflation has exceeded permanently and 
substantially its target, and values above 5 per cent are 
expected in the short term as well. This high inflation is 
partly attributable to frequent and considerable cost 
shocks: food and oil price increases as well as inflationary 
tax measures followed one another in Hungary in recent 
years. However, as the inflation target has been missed 
continuously, the possibility arises that continued cost 
shocks have increased inflation expectations and result in 
stronger second-round effects. International experience 
also shows that persistent deviations from the target add to 
inflation expectations,2 which only start to decline when 
inflation gets close to the target again. The unfolding food 
and commodity price shock and next year’s tax measures 
will increase inflation again, i.e. the expectation problem 
caused by cost shocks may potentially remain in place. 
If the path-through of cost shocks into prices and wages is 
stronger, inflation and nominal wages may also be higher 
than expected in the baseline scenario. The higher nominal 
path calls for a tightening of monetary conditions. Growth 
is somewhat lower than in the baseline scenario, and 
inflation will reach the target more slowly. 
In recent years inflation has been typically influenced by 
two-directional developments. The cost shocks added to 
inflation, which was offset by the effect of the loose labour 
market and the weak domestic demand. The disinflationary 
effect of domestic demand depends on the cyclical 
position. However, the estimations of the output gap and 
potential output are surrounded by high uncertainty. 
Measurement problems have only increased since the crisis. 
The Monetary Council selected two scenarios that it believes to capture the risks around the baseline forecast. These 
scenarios depict the uncertainty related to developments in inflation and to the cyclical position. Continued cost shocks 
and permanently above-target inflation raise the possibility that due to high inflation expectations the path-through of 
these shocks into prices and wages is stronger, which results in a higher nominal path. This possibility is examined by the 
first scenario. The other scenario analyses the effects of higher potential output than what is assumed in the baseline 
scenario. The higher nominal path results in a tighter monetary policy and inflation reaching the target more slowly. In 
contrast, higher potential output allows looser monetary policy, and is associated with a higher growth path.
2  effects of alternative scenarios on 
our forecast
2 See the relevant analysis of the Bank of England in its 2011 Q2 Quarterly Bulletin.
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EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS ON OUR FORECAST
There is a general agreement that the crisis damaged 
output potential to a considerable extent. However, the 
uncertainty concerning its magnitude and the future path of 
potential output remains high. Based on our estimations 
using several methods, and comparing them to international 
evidence, the potential growth path assumed in the 
baseline scenario does not appear extreme. Nevertheless, 
it cannot be ruled out that we overestimate the damaging 
effect of the crisis and its short and longer-term 
consequences. With higher potential growth and a wider 
output gap, the price reducing effect of domestic demand 
is stronger and the labour market is looser. The looser 
labour market and wider output gap together result in 
lower inflation. The more favourable inflation path is 
consistent with lower interest rates, i.e. this scenario allows 
monetary policy to be looser than the one in the baseline 
scenario. The growth path is more favourable than in the 
baseline scenario, mainly because of the benevolent 
assumption on potential growth (Charts 2-1 and 2-2).
Chart 2-2
the impact of the risk scenarios on our Gdp forecast
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3.1.1  developMentS In GloBal 
eConoMIC aCtIvIty
Growth in developed and developing economies decelerated 
slightly in Q2 and euro-area output declined (Chart 3-1). 
Growth in the US and Japan fell slightly in Q2, whereas the 
economy of the euro area contracted by 0.2 per cent. 
Global prospects were greatly influenced by the fact that 
uncertainty about fiscal policy and the banking sector in 
3  Macroeconomic overview
3.1  the international environment
Global economic growth decelerated slightly in Q2. Economic activity declined both in the developed and developing 
countries and euro-area output fell. Inflation risks fell in Q2, which allowed several central banks to ease monetary 
conditions. As of July, both food prices and the world market price of oil increased strongly, narrowing the room for 
manoeuvre of central banks pursuing an inflation targeting policy.
International financial market sentiment continues to be influenced most strongly by developments in the European debt 
crisis and expectations about the relevant economic policy reactions. The financial market optimism of recent months is 
primarily attributable to investors’ expectations concerning the management of the crisis. The decision and implementation 
risks related to measures related to crisis management declined slightly.
Chart 3-1
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the euro area intensified again in the middle of the year, 
but then eased considerably by August as a result of several 
announcements. The deterioration in growth prospects 
determined labour market developments as well. The 
increase in employment in developed countries stalled, 
while euro-area unemployment continued to grow. The 
unemployment rate declined only in Germany. Growth in 
the German economy continued in Q2, mainly reflecting the 
recovery in construction and the performance of exports to 
non-euro-area countries. Economic growth in China, which 
is a remarkable contributor to the world economy, 
decelerated slightly, due to the slacker investment growth 
and weakening exports to the euro area.
Short-term economic indicators reflect a slowdown in global 
economic growth. Both the confidence indicators in the 
euro area and the USA (Ifo, EABCI, Michigan) and the leading 
indicators (OECD CLI, CPB, Eurocoin, PMI) foreshadow easing 
global activity (Chart 3-2).
Global economic growth may accelerate in 2013, but risks 
continue to be high, and the expected economic performance 
of individual regions may vary considerably. The escalation 
of the euro-area debt crisis and persistently high oil prices 
represent a downside risk to global growth. According to 
the forecasts of major international institutions, the US 
economy is expected to grow by more than 2 per cent next 
year. At the same time, the result of the elections and the 
effects of the fiscal measures expected for next year pose 
additional downside risks to growth. The prospects for the 
euro-area economy are unfavourable; following this year’s 
downturn, only moderate growth is expected for next year 
as well. Growth in emerging countries has been strong, 
Chart 3-2
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despite the perceptible slowdown, and their economic 
performance may continue to improve in 2013 as developed 
countries continue to recover. Of the emerging countries, 
growth in China carries the greatest risk, as a possible 
slowdown in Chinese economic activity may be felt globally 
as well, due to the size of the economy.
Economic performance has varied considerably in our 
region. Growth was recorded for the economies of Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia, but those of the Czech Republic and 
Hungary contracted. Continued fiscal adjustment in the 
euro area and the recession point to a further downturn in 
Hungary’s external demand.
Overall, economic activity deteriorated slightly in the 
developed world, but a modest pick-up is expected to take 
place in the second half of the year. Prospects for business 
activity deteriorated in the euro area, Hungary’s major 
export market.
3.1.2  GloBal trendS In InflatIon
Developments in commodity price were mixed following Q1. 
Energy prices fell by 25 per cent in Q2, before increasing 
again from July and then stabilising at the the Q1 oil price 
levels by mid-August (Chart 3-4). The strike in the oil 
industry in Norway and the oil embargo against Iran from 
July may have contributed to the increase. In addition, 
expectations related to quantitative easing strengthened in 
financial markets, possibly also resulting in speculation that 
commodity prices would rise. Food prices rose considerably, 
after declining slightly early in the year. The increase in 
food prices is attributable to the bad production conditions 
and the poor weather. July and August data suggest that a 
food price shock is unfolding (Chart 3-5). This is indicated 
by the surge in wheat and corn prices and the developments 
in futures prices this year and in 2013. The increase in food 
prices together with the current oil prices may pose an 
upside risk to inflation for the rest of the year.
Trends in inflation were in line with the commodity price 
changes both in the developed and developing countries. In 
the euro area, the consumer price index fell until July, but 
then increased to 2.6 per cent in August, due to the rising 
energy prices (Chart 3-6). Longer-term inflation expectations 
continue to be well-anchored. Inflation in the USA was 
falling steadily and by July the rate had moved well below 
the 2 per cent target which was announced in January. 
Nevertheless, long-term inflation expectations continue to 
be stable. The increase in consumer prices in the UK 
economy was slowing since the beginning of the year, 
reaching 2.4 per cent by June. Market participants were 
surprised by the increase in inflation in July. With the 
Chart 3-4
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deceleration in economic growth and falling energy prices, 
Chinese inflation declined to 1.8 per cent in July, but 
rebounded to 2 per cent in August.
3.1.3  Monetary polICy and 
fInanCIal Market developMentS
Weakening growth prospects and the decline in oil prices 
created scope for monetary easing in several countries. In 
July, the ECB reduced the interest rate on its main 
refinancing operations by 25 basis points to 0.75 per cent. 
According to the explanation, inflationary pressures had 
declined over the policy horizon, and inflation expectations 
remained anchored and were consistent with the price 
stability definition of the ECB. The Fed announced a new 
asset purchase programme in September aiming to buy 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the volume of USD 40 
bn. The asset purchase programme supplements the two 
earlier tools, the ‘Operation Twist’ (extending the average 
maturity of the securities in the balance sheet of the Fed) 
and its policy of reinvesting principal payments from its 
holdings of agency debt in agency MBS. These two 
programmes will be continued through the end of the year. 
The three programmes together will increase the volume of 
the long-term securities in the Fed portfolio by USD 85 bn 
per month. According to the forecast of the Fed, inflation 
will remains at the target, economic growth will pick up, 
and unemployment may decrease below 7 per cent by end 
2014. Furthermore, the federal funds rate is likely to remain 
at the current zero-level target range until mid-2015. The 
Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England increased 
the volume of its asset purchase programme by GBP 50 bn 
to GBP 375 bn (26.9 per cent of GDP) in July and established 
a new non-conventional tool (‘Funding for Lending Scheme’, 
Chart 3-7
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developments in major stock market indices 
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Chart 3-6
Inflation in major economies 
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FLS) together with the Treasury which may provide the 
option of borrowing government bonds for other assets. The 
tool is expected to strengthen banks’ lending activity as 
funding is linked to their lending performance.
Most of the central banks in the region pursued a wait-and-
see policy. Before the August decision of the MNB, the 
Czech central bank cut the base rate by 25 basis points to 
0.5 per cent in July. According to their explanation, 
economic activity data falling short of expectations did not 
indicate domestic inflationary pressure in the economy, 
whereas inflation may decline to below the target as the 
effects of the VAT increase fade. Following an unexpected 
interest rate increase in May, the Polish central bank left its 
policy rate unchanged, which was justified by inflation 
remaining above the target. The Romanian central bank did 
not change the policy rate in the past months due to the 
upside risks to inflation. 
After the financial market uncertainty in the first two 
quarters, global market sentiment turned positive from 
end-July, with the further announcements related to the 
management of the crisis playing an important role in this 
(Chart 3-9, and further details in Box 3-1). First, in July 2012 
the Council of the European Union decided to permit the 
deceleration of the pace of the Spanish fiscal consolidation. 
Second, the August announcement by the ECB that it was 
planning to develop a bond purchase programme focusing 
on short-term government securities also improved investor 
sentiment. As a result, premia in periphery countries 
declined spectacularly; yields on medium-term (e.g. three-
year) securities fell extremely sharply (Chart 3-10). These 
developments were globally amplified by the fact that 
market expectations related to the major central banks’ 
quantitative easing led to a change in investor sentiment. 
Consequently, capital flowed to riskier countries. At the 
same time, there is a general market consensus that 
renewed optimism is mostly related to the market 
expectations of the ECB’s steps and not to concrete 
measures; accordingly, the risk of a possible correction is 
high. The persistence of the decline in yields largely 
depends on future decisions related to European crisis 
management, on the functioning of the crisis funds, the 
continuation of the Greek programme and the results of the 
Spanish financial programme.
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In recent years, strong correlation has been observed between global macroeconomic prospects and developments in financial market 
and capital market indicators. Developments in the past quarter were contradictory in this respect. While global macroeconomic 
figures tended to indicate deteriorating prospects, international financial market sentiment started to improve perceptibly as of end-
July. Demand for emerging market assets increased considerably, which was also reflected in premia on domestic assets and the 
developments in the exchange rate of the forint. The positive sentiment may have been strengthened by several factors.
Serious debates are going on regarding the conditions of a possible external financial package intended for the recapitalisation of 
Spanish banks. According to reports, no fiscal targets will be linked to the Spanish bank rescue package; moreover, Spain given an 
extension to meet the deficit target (the original deadline of 2013 for reducing the deficit to below 3 per cent was modified to 2014). 
Concerning the looser conditions of the Spanish financial package, investors came to the conclusion that European decision-makers 
also perceived the risks of excessive fiscal tightening; this development was generally greeted by investors.
The monetary policies of developed country central banks (close-to-zero base rate and quantitative easing) reduced the yields on 
government securities of less risky countries to an all-time low. Especially high expectations preceded the news related to a possible 
third asset purchase programme of the Fed. The application of a further programme was discussed at each meeting of the Federal 
Open Market Committee, and finally the quantitative easing was announced after their September meeting. The monetary policies of 
central banks in developed countries may encourage some of the institutional investors (insurance corporations, pension funds or even 
banks) to invest their money in riskier assets offering higher yields. Accordingly, capital may flow into riskier assets and countries.
With its announcements in early August and in September, the ECB took steps towards playing a more determined role in crisis 
management. With its commitment to purchasing shorter-term periphery bonds, the ECB may take on a role that has been expected 
by investors for a long time. Although long-term yields in the periphery continue to reflect the uncertainty of the situation, three-year 
government securities yields and five-year CDS spreads have declined considerably since the second half of July. Countries that apply 
for assistance from the EFSF/ESM funds and meet their undertakings set out therein may participate in the ECB’s OMT (Outright 
Monetary Transactions) programme. In the case of the countries under the EFSF programme, a further condition is the appearance as 
an issuer in the primary market. This instrument may be successful over the longer term, because it may complement the operation 
of the EFSF/ESM crisis funds. If the adjustment programmes are implemented as planned, no bankruptcy based on self-fulfilling fear 
may develop due to the unrealistically high yield spreads. On the other hand, in connection with the ESM fund the limited nature of 
its effective lending capacity arose, which may be offset by the ‘unlimited’ volume of the OMT scheme. Successful application of this 
instrument requires the establishment of the ESM fund, a pre-condition of which was the positive decision of the German Constitutional 
Court in September.
Box 3-1
factors behind the improvement of financial market sentiment despite the deteriorating macroeconomic indicators
Quarterly report on inflation • September 201234
The downturn in the performance of the Hungarian 
economy continued in 2012 Q2. Thus, gross domestic 
product declined in the second consecutive quarter, after 
stagnating at the end of last year, fulfilling the condition of 
a technical recession. Both domestic and external factors 
contributed to the continued slackening of the aggregate 
demand environment (Chart 3-11). The reduction in debt 
accumulated prior to the crisis may restrain private sector 
demand for years to come. Against the background of weak 
labour market conditions, the effect of the considerable 
decline in real incomes is increasingly reflected in 
households’ consumption and investment decisions. 
Although the outflow of banks’ external funds slowed down 
in the middle of the year, lending conditions continue to be 
tight. In addition to the weak domestic demand conditions, 
external factors also deteriorated this year as Hungary’s 
export markets slowed.
3.2.1  foreIGn trade
Macro data for Q2 indicated that international economic 
activity would be less favourable than previously expected. 
Consequently, our picture of external demand worsened. 
Although GDP data in Germany − Hungary’s main export 
market − were more favourable than expected, the upswing 
was mainly related to domestic consumption. Industrial 
production, which is a determinant factor influencing 
Hungarian exports, is weakening in the German economy as 
well, inducing slower growth in the volume of Hungarian 
goods exports (Chart 3-12). Slower growth in goods exports 
was offset somewhat by the slight upturn in the export of 
services, with the strong exchange rate depreciation at the 
end of last year possibly also making a contribution in this 
regard. Similarly to the first quarter, net exports made a 
3.2  aggregate demand
Following a significant decline in the first quarter, the contraction in Hungary’s gross domestic product continued in the 
second quarter, although to a lesser extent. Both external and domestic factors contributed to the deterioration in demand 
conditions. The reduction in private and government debt accumulated prior to the crisis, the generally tight lending 
conditions and the uncertain economic environment are acting as a drag on domestic demand, while the slowdown 
experienced in Hungary’s external markets may reduce export dynamics. The general deterioration in the demand 
environment and weak domestic demand in particular continue to have a considerable disinflationary impact, offsetting 
the feed-through effects stemming from commodity price increases.
Chart 3-11
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significant positive growth contribution, thanks to slightly 
rising exports and stagnating imports.
Over the short run, the domestic outlook deteriorated 
slightly compared to previous months. New industrial 
export orders have decreased in the last few months, after 
rising sharply in March and April. Confidence indicators 
suggest that growth in Hungary’s export markets may be 
subdued in Q3 as well, although its negative impact on 
exports may be offset by the further strengthening of the 
Mercedes factory’s production expected during the autumn 
months.
3.2.2  houSehold ConSuMptIon
Household consumption moderated mildly in H1. Available 
retail trade data suggest that household purchases have 
decreased to a greater extent (Chart 3-13), while the 
decline in household consumption has been more significant 
in the case of manufactured goods, but more moderate in 
respect of services and food products. Household real 
income has been declining since the beginning of the year, 
and its negative impact on consumption may become more 
and more pronounced. The administrative wage increases 
implemented at the beginning of the year only offset the 
effect of tax measures in the case of those whose earnings 
are below the average, while rising inflation is eroding real 
incomes in general. This year, the sectors which are of key 
importance in terms of households’ entrepreneurial incomes 
(agriculture, construction, trade) showed extremely weak 
economic performance, due partly to sector specific shocks 
and this has further exacerbated the decline in real incomes 
(Chart 3-15). The improvement in the household confidence 
indicator at the beginning of the year proved to be 
temporary. The indicator stagnated at a low level in Q2, 
which continues to suggest cautious behaviour by 
households.
Developments in lending to the household sector did not 
improve with the end of the early repayment scheme, as 
the decline in outstanding loans continued in 2012 Q2. 
Households continue to be net repayers. The continued 
decline in the stock of lending is basically attributable to 
the extremely low level of new loans: gross lending by the 
banking sector was at a historical low in the quarter (Chart 
3-14).
Conditions on bank lending to households were exceptionally 
tight during the early repayment period. Price terms did 
not become more favourable following the end of the early 
repayment scheme. According to the latest lending survey, 
in addition to supply constraints, loan demand was also 
weaker than expected by banks. The demand of households 
Chart 3-13
Changes in retail sales, earnings and the consumer 
confidence index 
−70
−60
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
Ju
ly
 0
5
Fe
b.
 0
6
Se
p.
 0
6
A
pr
. 
07
N
ov
. 
07
Ju
ne
 0
8
Ja
n.
 0
9
A
ug
. 
09
M
ar
. 
10
O
ct
. 
10
M
ay
 1
1
D
ec
. 
11
Ju
ly
 1
2
Balance indicatorAnnual change (per cent)
Retail sales
Real net wage bill
Consumer confidence (right-hand scale)
Chart 3-14
net quarterly change in outstanding domestic loans to 
households; breakdown by loan purpose 
(2005 Q1−2012 Q2)
−800
−700
−600
−500
−400
−300
−200
−100
0
100
200
300
400
500
−800
−700
−600
−500
−400
−300
−200
−100
0
100
200
300
400
500
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
HUF BnHUF Bn
Net flow, bank loans for house purchase
Net flow, consumer and other bank loans
Net flow, nonbank loans for house purchase
Net flow, consumer and other nonbank loans
Net flow, total domestic loans
Chart 3-15
Structure of other household incomes
(2006−2010 average)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Other personal income Entrepreneurial income
Agriculture
Per cent
Construction 
Retail trade
Real estate 
transactions
Income from 
other sectors
Entrepreneurial
income 
Income from
financial wealth
Income from real 
estate
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QuARTERlY REpoRT oN INflATIoN • SEpTEMBER 201236
with foreign currency debt for lending continues to be 
reduced by their strained income position: actual recourse 
to the exchange rate limit was negligible until June. The 
majority of the households concerned are expected to 
enter the scheme only in the second half of the year.
In the coming quarters, in addition to tight lending 
conditions and uncertain economic prospects, the fall in 
real income may continue to drive developments in 
household consumption.
3.2.3  prIvate InveStMent
Private sector investment was subdued in Q2 as well. 
Similarly to previous quarters, this may be attributable to 
the uncertainties related to the demand outlook and the 
regulatory environment, in addition to the increasingly tight 
lending environment (Chart 3-16).
Corporate investment continued to be characterised by the 
dual trends seen last year. Underlying investment 
developments are weak in the majority of sectors, with this 
only offset by the effect of the large investment projects 
implemented in the manufacturing sector. The sector’s 
investment activity remained close to the high level of last 
year as a result of the ongoing Audi and GM projects. Aside 
from the automotive industry, most sectors are characterised 
by weak investment activity, and thus the expansion of the 
capital stock continues to be extremely restrained.
In 2012 Q2, the decline in corporate lending continued in a 
volume similar to that of the previous period. Outstanding 
short and long-term corporate loans declined. The weakness 
in corporate lending is explained by both demand and 
supply factors. On the one hand, the supply of bank credit 
continued to be characterised by the already strict lending 
conditions and further tightening. On the other hand, with 
the deterioration in economic activity, the supply side may 
also have been an obstacle to lending. With the low level of 
investment, demand for long-term loans continues to be 
subdued, whereas short-term borrowing may also have 
declined, due to the fall in industrial production (Chart 
3-18).
Based on housing market data, household investment 
continued to decline in Q2. Households’ weak income 
position and tight lending conditions continue to be the 
underlying reasons for this. Following stagnation for several 
quarters, the number of building permits declined slightly 
again in Q2 (Chart 3-17). Accordingly, the number of 
dwellings completed may reach a historically low level in 
the coming quarters. No turnaround is expected this year. 
Looking ahead, household investment may be stimulated to 
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some extent by the state-subsidised housing loans that are 
becoming available from Q3. Based on the gradual 
introduction, the size of the programme and the conditions, 
the expansion is likely to be subdued. The subsidy is 
available for used homes as well, so the effect of the 
measure may only partly affect the market of newly 
constructed dwellings.
3.2.4  InventorIeS
Uncertain growth prospects and tight corporate lending 
conditions continue to justify the maintenance of the tight 
inventory management typical since the crisis in the private 
sector. Accordingly, in the majority of the sectors a decline 
in the inventories was observed. Due to unfavourable 
weather conditions, the weak agricultural performance 
expected for this year may also contribute to the decline in 
inventories. A significant build-up of inventories was 
observed only in the energy production branches (Chart 
3-19).
3.2.5  GovernMent deMand
Government consumption demand is determined by the 
fiscal adjustment measures launched earlier and taken 
additionally this year. Accordingly, government consumption 
expenditure decreased in Q2. The volume of pharmaceutical 
and transport subsidies declined to an especially large 
extent. The funding of government investment continues to 
be characterised by strong duality: the ratio of investment 
implemented from budgetary sources is declining, which is 
offset by an increase in the use of EU funds. However, the 
withdrawal of the EU was slower than expected in the last 
few quarters, contributing to the larger-than-expected 
decrease in government investment.
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After the start of the year, the decline in economic output 
continued in Q2. During this period, on yearly basis, 
Hungarian GDP decreased by 1.3 per cent. The decrease in 
the production with the macroeconomic environment was 
general in most sectors. The slowdown in Hungary’s export 
markets resulted in a fall in output even in the export-
oriented production sectors which had previously shown 
continuous growth. The performance of the sectors 
producing for the domestic market continues to be poor. 
Construction has not bottomed out this year either, and 
value added in agriculture may be weak historically as well 
this year, due to the drought (Chart 3-21). Value added in 
market services may have declined in Q2 as well, which − in 
addition to the fall in retail trade turnover − was corroborated 
by the developments in the activity of financial services.
Last year, the results in agricultural production were more 
favourable than average. This year, however, considerably a 
smaller harvest is expected as a result of frost damages and 
the dry weather. Harvest estimates for and results of major 
crops indicate that the performance of the sector may fall 
significantly short of not only last year’s favourable base, 
but also the historical average (Chart 3-22).
Against the background of deteriorating external market 
conditions, industrial production declined in Q2 as well, and 
so this sector could not support the growth in Q2. Significant 
improvement of our export markets can not be expected in 
the short run, so the value added of the industry may shrink 
further (Chart 3-23). This is also supported by the data in 
July, which signal a further decrease in industrial production. 
In March, the Mercedes factory launched its production. 
3.3  production and potential output
Economic output contracted in 2012 Q2. Against the background of a general deterioration in macroeconomic conditions, 
one-off effects affecting the output of some sectors may also have appeared in the weak Q2 GDP figure. Due to the 
slowdown in economic growth in Hungary’s export markets, the output of the export-oriented sectors is insufficient to 
offset the downturn in the sectors producing for the domestic market. As a temporary effect, this year’s weak agricultural 
harvest results may cause a significant reduction in this year’s GDP.
The trend decline in the investment rate over the past six years and the increase in long-term unemployment point to a 
slowdown in potential growth. The decelerating expansion of production capacities in the economy may gradually reduce 
the disinflationary impact of weak demand, adding to the second-round inflation risk of cost-push shocks.
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Although the related effect is significant, it was offset by 
the general deterioration in external market sentiment and 
other temporary factors. The capacity reduction in the 
electronics sector has not come to an end, and thus it may 
reduce the performance of industry in the coming months 
as well (Chart 3-24). The restart of some refineries which 
was stopped (temporarily) in Q2 and the expansion of 
production expected in the Kecskemét plant of Mercedes 
may soften the magnitude of the downturn of the sector for 
the remainder of the year. The performance of the 
transport sector, which is closely related to industrial 
production and external demand, also continued to slow in 
the first half of the year.
Construction output continued to decline in H1. Although 
the latest data in July showed a significant correction in the 
output of the sector, with the sluggish growth in new orders 
we can not expect any marked turnaround. This year, the 
market of new dwellings may bottom out at a historically 
low level, and no recovery is expected in the near term. 
Infrastructure projects financed from EU funds may improve 
the overall picture slightly in the next quarter. For the time 
being, their impact has only appeared in the increasing new 
orders, thus it may increase production perceptibly only in 
the coming quarters (Chart 3-25).
Following stagnation in Q1, retail sales declined in Q2. 
Purchases by non-residents may also have contributed to 
the improvement in the performance of the sector observed 
early in the year, which is mostly attributable to the 
weakness of the forint exchange rate at the beginning of 
the year. With the gradual appreciation of the exchange 
rate, this effect may have become weaker and weaker, and 
so the impact of still tight household lending conditions and 
declining real incomes became the main factors behind 
developments in retail trade. Looking ahead, sales 
expectations point to a further deterioration in the demand 
environment (Chart 3-26). Output of the tourism and 
catering sector may have continued to pick up in Q2. In 
addition to the favourable weather conditions, the hotel 
developments implemented in recent years also contributed 
to this.
The profit of the financial sector from traditional banking 
business and thus the sector’s added value were reduced by 
several factors in the first half of this year. Deposit 
withdrawals by households at the beginning of the year 
reduced domestic funds, while on the assets side the early 
repayment programme that took place until February 
resulted in a considerable reduction in households’ 
outstanding foreign currency loans. The activity of the 
sector in new lending proved to be even weaker than our 
earlier expectations. As a one-off factor, the profit-
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reducing effect of the early repayment programme that 
took place early in the year was also accounted for at the 
beginning of the year.
Our view of the potential level of output has not changed 
significantly since the June issue of the Quarterly Report on 
Inflation. The new capacity-increasing investment projects 
implemented in the automotive industry were unable to 
fully offset the broad-based decline in investment. 
Accordingly, the growth rate of the capital stock may have 
continued to decline this year. Labour market activity 
increased continuously in the past two years. This pick-up 
in labour supply, however, was not associated with a 
corresponding increase in employment. The unemployment 
rate remained at a persistently high level in recent years, 
which may continue to pose a risk in terms of the renewed 
employability of those concerned. Overall, the developments 
observed both in the labour market and capital accumulation 
indicate a sustained deceleration in potential growth (Chart 
3-27).
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In 2009, Mercedes-Benz established an assembly plant in Kecskemét; production started at end-March 2012. According to the plans, 
also revealed in the press, 40,000 cars may be assembled this year and 100,000 next year. In parallel with the running-in of production, 
the number of employees also increased and may reach 3,000 people by the end of the year. Based on the volumes of the investment 
and the expected output, this single plant has a considerable effect at the aggregate level as well. However, the data for recent months 
confirmed this only to a limited extent, surprising analysts from month to month. The question is whether the worse than expected 
data can be attributed to the lower stimulating effect of the Mercedes plant, or to other effects.
To answer this question we first examined the performance of the automotive industry in the region. The region remains attractive 
for large European automotive manufacturers. In 2004 the region accounted for 9 per cent of the cars manufactured in the European 
Union; in 2011 this share was already close to 20 per cent. This trend may continue in the coming years. In the past two years, the 
Box 3-2
What explains the recent weakness of industrial production?
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growth rate of domestic vehicle manufacturing lagged behind the 
average of the region. On the other hand, since the installation of 
new capacities earlier this year the relative position of Hungary 
has improved (Chart 3-28). At the same time the improvement 
was not outstanding. In the same period, new capacity has been 
created in the Slovakian automotive industry, which has improved 
much more dynamically. This can signal that although the output 
of the Mercedes factory has appeared in the statistics as expected 
both in terms of magnitude and timing (a hypothesis supported by 
press information), but decreasing production in the rest of the 
automotive industry offset this. According to statistics, falling 
demand has had severe effect on the production of the biggest 
domestic exporter, the Suzuki factory, which may have had 
notable effect on the whole sector.
Meanwhile, the considerable shifts in global competiveness have 
affected numerous domestic companies (i.e. Nokia, Sanyo, 
Flextronics, Dunaferr) negatively, to which they reacted with 
layoffs and production cuts. Besides, domestic and international 
business activity has generally been falling, reducing production 
dynamics. This effect is present in the wide range of the sectors 
in the industry (Chart 3-29). Growth was recorded only in vehicle 
manufacturing and the food industry; other sectors were 
characterised by downturn or stagnation. As a result of continued 
balance sheet adjustment in the private sector, declining real 
incomes and continued weak lending activity, domestic demand 
cannot provide considerable support to industrial production. At 
the same time, the decline in business activity is becoming more 
pronounced on our most important export markets as well.
To conclude, the short term outlook in the industry has been 
worsening in the recent months, thus the sector cannot give a 
notable boost to economic growth until the end of this year. We 
expect a turnaround in external demand at the end of the year, 
which that can result in a revival of industrial production. Early 
next year further capacities start to operate in the automotive 
industry (first in the Opel and later in the Audi factory), which can 
give further momentum to the sector.
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In line with the trend seen in recent years, labour market 
activity continued to increase in 2012 Q2. As a result of 
stimulatory government measures (mainly the tightening of 
retirement conditions and unemployment benefits), the 
activity rate has increased by 2 percentage points compared 
to the pre-crisis level, reaching 57 per cent (Chart 3-30).
Available statistics concerning employment developments 
have painted quite varying pictures in recent quarters. 
According to labour survey data, the number of people 
employed in the total economy continued to grow in Q2. In 
our opinion, this is attributable to the increase in the 
number of subsidised jobs, while − in line with the 
deteriorating prospects for business activity − private 
sector companies are characterised by even more cautious 
labour demand than in previous months. Employment in the 
private sector did not change substantially in H1. However, 
the institutional survey data, which react more sensitively 
to the cyclical shifts in the economy, registered a fall in 
employment (details of this problem are discussed in Box 
3-3).
At the whole-economy level, the decline in demand of the 
private sector was offset by an increase in public 
employment. Although the number of employed at 
government institutions remained unchanged in the past 
quarter, the expansion of public work programmes resulted 
in an increase in the weight of public employment. Unlike 
in previous years, a greater portion of those employed in 
public work are employed in full-time programmes.
3.4  employment and labour market
Labour market activity has continued to expand in recent quarters. In addition to the increase in activity, employment 
also grew, resulting in a slight decline in the unemployment rate. The increase in employment is mainly attributable to 
the public work programmes, while private sector labour demand continues to be weak. To a great degree, the historically 
high unemployment figures reflect structural factors, and thus labour market conditions may less loose than previously 
assumed. In line with this, the wage-reducing effect of the high unemployment may be less pronounced.
The administrative pay rises early in the year resulted in an acceleration of wage growth, but excluding this effect the 
underlying processes of wage-setting may be characterised by more restrained dynamics than the average of pre-crisis 
years. Against the background of rising production costs, loose labour market conditions may reduce the second-round 
inflationary risks appearing through the labour market.
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Against the background of increasing activity and rising 
employment, the unemployment rate declined slightly in Q2 
(Chart 3-31). The significant volatility observed in the 
number of registered unemployed early in the year was 
caused by timing effects stemming from the closing of 
public work programmes at the end of the year and their 
relaunch at the beginning of the year. In recent years, the 
proportion of people who have been searching for a job for 
more than one year has increased, which indicates the 
deepening structural reasons of the unemployment.
The unemployed-to-vacancy ratio continues to be high. The 
Beveridge curve moved to the left in the past quarter, due 
to the decline in the number of registered unemployed. As 
those leaving their jobs mainly found employment in one of 
the forms of public employment or retired into inactivity, 
the labour market can still be considered loose, although 
− compared our formal estimates − it has decreased (Chart 
3-32).
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The CSO publishes two types of statistical surveys to measure employment in the private sector. One of them is the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS), which is based on the questioning of individuals, the other is the institutional statistics (IS), which are based on data 
provided by enterprises and budgetary institutions. Over longer horizons, the two statistics usually paint nearly the same picture of 
developments in private sector employment. However, in the short-run, there may also be differences between the two surveys. Our 
forecast is based on the LFS, as these statistics represent the domestic labour market as a whole, contrary to the institutional survey, 
which only covers institutions employing more than 4 people.
There have been substantial differences between the two surveys in recent years, making the assessment of the current situation of 
the domestic labour market particularly difficult. While private sector employment already moved from the low levels during the crisis 
already in 2010 according to the IS, the LFS showed stagnating employment until early 2011. Then the increase in the number of 
employed in 2010 shown in the institutional statistics came to a halt, and stagnated until early 2012, when it started to decline again. 
In contrast, based on the LFS figures, following an upswing in 2011, until the latest published actual figures (2012 Q2) companies in the 
private sector continuously incrased their staff; moreover, in 2012 Q2 they did it with dynamics not seen since the crisis.
Although the LFS represents the domestic labour market as a whole, it is the IS that shows closer co-movement with simultaneous 
developments in economic activity. Based on historical observations, the employment figures of the LFS follow the changes in 
economic activity only with a lag of two or three quarters. These conclusions are valid for the recent years as well, when there was 
greater harmony between developments in GDP and the figures of the IS. However, even these correlations cannot explain the surge 
in the LFS in 2012 Q2, as based on these statistics the increase in private sector employment seemed to come to a halt already in 2012 
Q1, and GDP figures for the first half of this year indicated a deterioration in economic performance.
In addition to the ones described above, there are further differences as well resulting from the methodologies of the two types of 
statistical surveys. However, based on our analyses, most of these methodological differences do not provide a satisfactory explanation 
to the differences observed between the two statistics in the past two quarters; therefore, a solution to the dilemma has to be found 
somewhere else.
Box 3-3
Contradictions in employment figures? the interpretation of this year’s employment data
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A methodological feature of the LFS is that it is able to capture 
the number of people employed in public work programmes only 
with high uncertainty; consequently, their classification into 
sectors is also uncertain. Accordingly, it may happen that some of 
the public workers are shown under the private sector; therefore, 
public workers are included in the public sector in our forecast.
Participants in public sector employment are kept on record much 
more precisely in the IS through the institutions that employ 
them. Therefore, in order to produce a private sector employment 
indicator that reflects greater compliance with the developments 
in economic activity, in this round we took account of the changes 
in the number of public workers on the basis of the institutional 
statistics. By deducting the number of public employees that does 
not contain the public workers from the whole-economy level 
number of employees of the LFS, the corrected number of 
employees in the competitive sector can be produced on the basis 
of the remainder principle. On the on hand this indicator is 
increasing after the second half of 2010. On th other hand, 
following the deteriorating growth figures, the adjusted indicator 
produced by this method indicates a slower growth in employment in the recent quarters, better approximating the similar statistics 
of the IS (Chart 3-33). However, considering that this correction is still unable to explain the whole gap between the two statistics, this 
difference may also have further statistical reasons.
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The dual trends of a recession in the real economy and 
rising inflation and gross wages continued to strengthen in 
Q2. The rising inflation was mainly attributable to cost 
shocks and indirect tax measures, whereas the pick-up in 
wage growth is mainly caused by administrative measures. 
Filtering out these effects, underlying developments show 
a lower value, however compared to last year, regarding 
both the price level and the wages, accelerating dynamics 
can be observed. The effect of the weak demand conditions 
on prices and wages can be smaller than our former 
estimates.
Against the background of deteriorating demand conditions, 
the economy may be still characterised by significant spare 
capacities with regard to all factors of production. This is 
also reflected in the low levels of the indicators measuring 
capacity utilisation (Chart 3-34).
According to our estimate, the output gap may have been 
around 2 per cent in 2012 H1. Capacity utilisation indicators 
and the weak growth figures at the beginning of the year 
also indicate that the cyclical position of the economy may 
deteriorate, following two years of slow improvement. The 
opening of the output gap may be caused mainly by further 
weakening in external demand, while the protracted 
balance sheet adjustment results in a trending decline 
domestic demand. 
Looking forward, a further opening of the output gap is 
expected over the short run as a result of external and 
internal factors (Chart 3-35). Weak external demand may 
increase spare capacities in the export sector. Tight lending 
conditions, fiscal adjustment and and deteriorating real 
incomes continue to restrain domestic demand. In our 
opinion, these effects are mainly of cyclical origin, and may 
primarily impair the cyclical position of consumption.
3.5  Cyclical position of the economy
In the slack demand environment, the economy may continue to be characterised by a significant amount of spare 
capacity. As a result of persistently high unemployment and permanently low investment activity, the potential growth of 
the economy may have continued to decelerate, which may offset the disinflationary impact of weak demand. Over the 
short run, demand conditions are expected to continue to deteriorate. Accordingly, the output gap, which was gradually 
closing until the second half of last year, may widen again.
Chart 3-34
demand constraints in the main sectors according to the eSI 
survey*
(2005 Q1−2012 Q3)
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
2
1
0
1
−2
−3
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Points of standard deviationPoints of standard deviation
Better demand
conditions
Industry
Construction
Servives
* Insufficient demand as the main obstacle ahead of production, 
standardized, on an inverse scale.
Chart 3-35
Changes in the output gap*
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from data indicating capacity utilization in the private sector.
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3.6.1  WaGeS
Private sector wage growth accelerated significantly in H1. 
Regular earnings increased by an average 8 per cent in H1, 
which is attributable to the administrative measures 
entering into force at the beginning of the year. At various 
wage levels, the measures had different effects on 
companies’ wage-setting. There was a marked difference 
between wage developments of those who earn below and 
above the average wage (Chart 3-36).3
The administrative measures4 mainly caused a sudden rise 
in the wage index of those with lower earnings, i.e. below 
HUF 200,000 per month on average. Although the measures 
entered into force as of January, the majority of companies 
employing more than 50 people implemented the necessary 
wage increases only in May. By contrast, among those not 
affected by the measures, the wages of those who earn 
more than HUF 200,000 per month showed more restrained 
dynamics, in line with the weak labour demand conditions.
Inflationary pressures from the labour market may be offset 
by several factors. Companies continue to cut back irregular 
pay. Other labour income in the private sector (primarily 
the cafeteria payments) is more than 10 per cent below the 
payments observed last year (Chart 3-37). In addition, the 
3.6  Costs and inflation
As a result of the administrative wage increases at the beginning of the year, the wage index of the private sector 
accelerated considerably, but even after filtering out this effect there was a rise in the underlying wage developments. 
Companies adjusted to the increase in wage costs by making use of the government wage compensation and cutting fringe 
benefits. Exceeding the inflation target, inflation figures have been close to 6 per cent in recent months. The cost shocks 
and indirect tax increases were the main factors contributing to this rise in inflation, while demand-side inflationary 
pressure remained subdued, albeit the price-reducing effect of this may be smaller than in the past. Of products sensitive 
to demand, the prices of market services showed low dynamics, while developments in tradables over the period were 
determined by weak demand and the earlier weak forint exchange rate.
Over the short run, unprocessed food prices, which are rising as a result of the unfavourable weather, and oil prices, which 
are remaining at a high level, point to an increase in inflationary pressures. The price-increasing effects of these factors 
may be mitigated by the forint exchange rate, which was stronger in the past period, and by weak domestic demand.
Chart 3-36
the index of average gross earnings among employees 
below and above 200 thousand huf*
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* Annual growth rates, based on seasonally adjusted monthly data.
3  Due to the 2011 personal income tax measures, the wage indices of those with high and low earnings parted from one another already at the beginning 
of last year.
4 Mandatory minimum wage, guaranteed wage minimum increase, mandatory recommended wage increase bands for recourse to wage compensation.
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widespread use of public wage compensation dampens the 
cost increase as well. Besides these factors, rising labour 
costs as a result of administrative measures and declining 
productivity caused further acceleration in unit labour cost 
in the first half of the year. The increase in unit labour cost 
exceeds the pre-crisis average, which can cause tensions for 
companies, especially for those producing for the domestic 
market, as they operating in permanently weak demand 
environment (Chart 3-38).
Average gross earnings of government sector employees 
declined in the first half of this year. The main underlying 
reason is the composition effect stemming from the high 
number of public employees; the exclusion of public 
employees from the calculation results in positive wage 
indices.
3.6.2  produCer prICeS
The prices of agricultural products have been rising since 
the beginning of the year. Via the surge in egg prices, the 
stricter rules introduced in animal husbandry at the 
beginning of the year resulted in a drastic increase in the 
prices of animal products, whereas in recent months rising 
seasonal food prices have contributed to the increase in 
producer prices. In July, a significant increase was seen in 
prices of cereals products (Chart 3-39).
In the year to date, unfavourable weather conditions 
affected developments in agricultural production not only 
in Hungary, but internationally as well. Therefore, looking 
ahead, further producer price increases are expected, 
which is also indicated by the high futures grain prices for 
the coming months.
As a result of the increases in world market prices and the 
appreciation of the forint exchange rate, the dynamics of 
industrial producer prices has remained practically 
unchanged in recent months (Chart 3-40).
3.6.3  ConSuMer prICeS
In the summer months of this year, the inflation continued 
to accelerate. In August, the consumer price index increased 
to 6 per cent. The increase in recent months was caused by 
rising unprocessed food inflation and the indirect tax 
increases which entered into force in the middle of the year 
(excise tax, telecommunication tax). In recent months, the 
inflation figures have been slightly less favourable than our 
projection (Chart 3-41).
Indirect tax increases (VAT and excise tax increases at the 
beginning of the year) and cost shocks represented a 
Chart 3-37
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Changes and components of unit labour cost in private 
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Chart 3-39
agricultural producer prices*
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significant contribution to inflation in previous months, 
while − following last year’s rise − no further increase was 
observed in inflation of the component is sensitive to 
demand (Chart 3-42).5 Domestic demand pressure is 
considered low. This picture is also confirmed by our 
indicators measuring short-term inflation developments. 
Following an increase early in the year, they indicated 
subdued pressure in recent months (Chart 3-43).
Tradables inflation was determined by the earlier weak 
forint exchange rate and weak demand. As a result of the 
significant depreciation of the exchange rate at the end of 
last year, the prices of non-durable goods have increased in 
recent months. In addition, annual inflation was influenced 
by one-off factors6 as well. Durable goods inflation continues 
to be negative. In spite of earlier cost increases, this 
product group is characterised by subdued price 
developments, which may be explained by the weak 
demand environment. The appreciation of the forint 
exchange rate in recent months may be reflected in 
tradables prices in the coming months.
Since February, monthly inflation of market services 
excluding tax changes has been more favourable, compared 
to the usual seasonality. As a result, the annual index of 
market services showed a slight decline. The changes in the 
prices of market services may reflect the price-reducing 
effect of weak domestic demand.
In line with producer prices, the prices of food products, 
which are sensitive to cost shocks, increased sharply in 
recent months, resulting in accelerated food price inflation 
again. The rising prices of processed food prices may be 
explained by the fact that producer prices and fuel prices 
remained at a high level. Within this product group, it was 
mainly processed meat products that contributed to the 
price increase. Changes in the prices of unprocessed food 
were affected by this year’s unfavourable weather, and 
prices of seasonal products (vegetables and fruits) rose 
significantly. As a result of the unfavourable weather 
conditions, a further price-increasing effect may appear 
from the side of producer prices.
After May, HUF-denominated oil prices fell which caused a 
reduction in fuel prices until August. Since August, as a 
result of rising global oil prices, fuel prices have started to 
rise again. Despite the rising commodity costs, regulated 
prices remained subdued. As a consequence of administered 
Chart 3-40
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Chart 3-42
development of consumer price index and core inflation 
excluding indirect tax effect and demand sensitive inflation 
(January 2005−August 2012)
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5  A more detailed overview can be found in chapter 6, among special topics.
6  An exceptionally high price increase was observed in June, which is mostly the consequence of one-off effects. Following a decline in May, the prices 
of flight tickets (recorded by the CSO in the item ‘other travels’) showed adjustment, and the prices of recreation abroad rose to a greater extent 
than the usual seasonality. The foreign component represents a significant portion in the changes in the prices of these two items, and they are 
sensitive to the exchange rate. Therefore, in the MNB’s classification of the consumer price index they are included in the category of non-durable 
tradable goods.
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measures in recent years, the item’s contribution to the 
consumer price index is historically low as well. Among 
medicinal products the transformation of support system 
caused an increase in subsidised medicine prices.
Overall, inflation in the period under review was kept at a 
high level by cost shocks and the tax measures implemented 
at the beginning of the year. Moderate price increases were 
observed in a wide range of products. Looking ahead, 
demand-side inflationary pressures may remain low in the 
coming months, but due to weak expansion of supply 
capacity its price reducing effect may be lower than our 
earlier estimations. In line with this, high oil prices and the 
unfolding food price shock may entail a deterioration in 
inflation developments. This effect may be partly offset by 
a stronger exchange rate.
3.6.4  InflatIon eXpeCtatIonS
Following an increase at the beginning of the year, 
households’ perceptions in connection with the expected 
inflation environment declined. The appreciation of the 
exchange rate, lower oil prices characterising the first half 
of this year and the overheads rising modaretely may have 
contributed to the decline. Despite the decline, households’ 
inflation perceptions continue to be at a high level (Chart 
3-44). Uncertainty of perceptions related to the expected 
inflation environment also increased in accordance with the 
strong volatility of inflation seen in recent quarters.
From the perspective of short-term developments in 
consumer prices, the expectations of the retail trade sector 
regarding sales prices are a key factor. In line with subdued 
domestic demand, expectations declined in H1. The 
increase observed last month may be explained by the rise 
in commodity prices (Chart 3-45).
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As a result of the unfavourable weather conditions, global 
agricultural crop harvests were well below expectations this year. 
Therefore, food prices increased sharply in commodity markets in 
July, and have remained at high levels since then. Information 
received from the main exporting countries indicates that wheat 
and especially corn harvests fall remain well below expectations. 
In Hungary, the picture is somewhat more favourable in the case 
of wheat; the crop is only slightly lower than last year. At the 
same time, the corn harvest may decline dramatically, by one-
quarter compared to 2011. The price of wheat rose by some 30–40 
per cent in a few days’ time in international markets, while the 
dollar price of corn already exceeds even the 2007−2008 record 
levels. Based on crop results and commodity exchange prices, a 
new food price shock is developing after 2007−2008 and 2010−2011. 
According to earlier experiences, food price shocks first appear in 
the agricultural producer price index, and they simultaneously 
add to the consumer prices of unprocessed foods. The price level 
of unprocessed foods typically reaches its peak in early autumn, 
and a stronger decline may start after several months of 
stagnation, if and when better harvest is collected next year. The 
price increase of food commodities may start to feed through into 
the prices of processed food during the autumn months, and 
prices may follow a significantly rising trend until the next harvest 
(Chart 3-46). 
A regional comparison of food price developments shows that 
commodity price increases usually appeared in domestic consumer 
prices to a greater extent than in other countries, and the decline 
following the fading of the shock also proved to be weaker (Chart 
3-47). Although for the time being the shock seems to be smaller 
than the previous ones, it may still generate a serious upward 
pressure on inflation. In addition, the unfavourable harvest may 
also have a negative contribution to Hungary’s GDP growth. Based 
on commodity market prices, the current food price shock may be 
two-thirds of the one in 2010−2011; accordingly, its impact on 
inflation may also prove to be weaker. Therefore, while food 
prices contributed to inflation by some 1.5 percentage points in 
2011, they may increase the 2013 consumer price index to a lesser 
extent, by around 1.0 percentage point.
Box 3-4
the pass-through of the food price shock into consumer prices
Chart 3-46
pass-through of food price shocks in the periods of 
2007−2008, 2010−2011 and 2012−2013*
(seasonally adjusted data; forecast as of September 2012)
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processed food price increases in the region 
(annual changes excluding VAT; based on HICP data, January 2003−
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4.1.1  rISk aSSeSSMent of hunGary
Over the past three months, the risk assessment of Hungary 
improved considerably. This was mainly attributable to a 
significant improvement in the international investment 
environment. Dissimilar trends were experienced in the 
country-specific component of Hungary’s risk assessment: 
while there was a minimal improvement until end-August, 
domestic factors have influenced the developments in a 
slightly negative direction in the period since then.
The considerable improvement in the international 
environment can mainly be ascribed to developments 
related to crisis management in the euro area. At the end-
June EU summit, several measures were adopted that 
reduced the pressure on periphery countries and their 
banking systems. The atmosphere was further improved by 
the launch of the new bond purchase programme of the 
European Central Bank as well. In addition, the expansion 
of the quantitative easing programme of the Fed also 
contributed to the increase in risk appetite. At the same 
time, the deterioration in the real economy outlook and the 
concerns related to the fiscal positions of Greece and Spain 
had an effect in the opposite direction, although this effect 
was moderate.
4  financial markets and interest rates
4.1  domestic financial market developments
Since end-June 2012, the risk perception of Hungary has improved considerably, primarily as the result of a material 
improvement in the international investment sentiment. This was mainly due to the progress in euro-area crisis 
management and the expansion of the quantitative easing programme of the Fed. Only minor shifts of varying directions 
were observed in the country-specific component of the risk perception of Hungary, which were mostly influenced by the 
latest developments related to the IMF talks and the 2013 budget bill. All this had a positive overall impact on domestic 
asset prices and on the exchange rate of the forint as well: the latter appreciated by a total of 3 per cent in the past 
three months, although it slightly underperformed compared to movements in the exchange rate of the zloty, which 
serves as a basis for regional comparison. In parallel with that, Hungary’s CDS and foreign exchange bond spreads also 
declined considerably (by 100–150 basis points), although at the end of the period under review Hungary diverged 
somewhat from regional trends in a negative direction. Reference yields of HUF-denominated government securities also 
fell considerably, while non-residents’ government securities holdings rose to a new record level of HUF 4,700 billion. As 
a result, non-resident market participants already hold 45 per cent of the total holdings of HUF-denominated treasury 
bills and bonds.
Chart 4-1
5-year sovereign CdS spreads in the region
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Spreads on risky assets declined in the favourable global 
atmosphere; the fall in government securities yields and 
CDS spreads of euro-area periphery countries was especially 
remarkable. In parallel with that, stock market indices 
showed a material increase, whereas most of the main risk 
indicators (FX and stock market volatility indicators and 
composite spreads) reached multi-annual lows.
The effect of country-specific developments was much 
weaker. According to the results of our CDS decomposition 
methodology (Chart 4-2), the adoption of the Central Bank 
Act in July and the ensuing start of the talks with the IMF 
contributed to the risk perception of Hungary rather 
positively. At the same time, through most of the period the 
country-specific component tended to stagnate, and in the 
first half of September the uncertainties related to the IMF 
talks and the 2013 budget resulted in a slight deterioration 
in Hungary’s relative assessment.
The five-year Hungarian CDS spread declined from 522 basis 
points early in the period close to the level of 370 basis 
points by the end of the period. Until the end of August the 
Hungarian spread practically moved together with the 
spreads of the countries in the region with a similar risk 
assessment, before slightly departing from them in 
September: the spreads of Croatia, Slovenia and Romania 
declined to a greater extent in this period (Chart 4-3).
The spread on Hungarian FX bonds compared to German 
yields fell considerably: declines of 100–150 basis points 
were observed, depending on maturity and denomination 
(Chart 4-4).
4.1.2  developMentS In foreIGn 
eXChanGe MarketS
Movements in the EUR/HUF exchange rate were also more 
influenced by the international atmosphere in the past three 
months. Of the events in Hungary, it was practically only the 
news and statements concerning the IMF talks that had a 
material impact. Accordingly, the exchange rate of the forint 
mostly moved together with the exchange rate of the Polish 
zloty, which serves as a reference, but the two currencies 
slightly departed from one another as of early September. 
Thus, appreciating some 5 per cent from its end-June levels, 
the exchange rate of the forint against the euro sank below 
the level of 275. Then, following volatile trading, it weakened 
from here to a level exceeding 280 by the end of the period 
under review. Overall, this represents nearly 3 per cent 
appreciation over the past three months (Chart 4-5).
In parallel with the strengthening of the forint, forward-
looking risk indicators of Hungary calculated from FX 
Chart 4-2
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Chart 4-3
Changes in 5-year CdS spreads in the region
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Chart 4-4
5-year eur-denominated currency bond spreads in the 
region
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FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INTEREST RATES
market option quotes also showed an improvement (Chart 
4-6).
Although the domestic FX swap market was characterised 
by calm and balanced trading for most of the period, by the 
end of June significant tensions evolved in the short 
segment of the domestic swap market for a short time. 
Some market participants sold their short-term forint assets 
(mainly MNB bill holdings) for a transitional period and used 
the resulting forint liquidity in the domestic FX swap 
market, which resulted in a major decline in the implied 
forint yields of short-term transactions. As the month came 
to a close, this tension was quickly corrected and the 
spreads of short-term swap transactions also declined 
considerably. 
The above developments did not have any major impact on 
the pricing of longer-term transactions. Accordingly, the 
three and six-month spreads continued to slowly decline 
over the past three months.
The net position of the non-resident sector declined 
considerably (by some HUF 300 billion) in the FX swap 
market, which was almost entirely attributable to a decline 
in the foreign exchange liquidity providing swap stock 
(Chart 4-7). This may be the result of two contrasting 
processes: while the shift in the forint exchange rate in a 
favourable direction resulted in a decline in the holdings, 
non-resident players’ net forint asset (mainly government 
securities) purchases may have resulted in an increase in 
foreign exchange liquidity providing swap stock. Overall, 
amid significant fluctuations, there was hardly any change 
in non-residents’ forint liquidity providing stock in the 
period under review.
4.1.3  GovernMent SeCurItIeS 
Market and ChanGeS In yIeldS
The primary government securities issues in recent months 
met with increased investor demand. The securities offered 
at most of the discount treasury bill and bond auctions of 
the Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK) were sold 
amid significant excess demand and with a gradually 
declining yield level. On several occasions, the Debt 
Management Agency increased the accepted quantity 
compared to the announced one, while the offered amounts 
were cut only rarely. Market interest picked up mainly for 
medium-term government bonds in the past period.
Non-residents’ government securities holdings continued to 
increase from end-June: with net purchases amounting to 
nearly HUF 500 billion, the sector’s total holdings exceeded 
HUF 4,700 billion. As a result, non-resident market 
Chart 4-5
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1-month implied volatility and risk reversal
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Chart 4-7
non-residents’ net forint–foreign exchange swap holdings 
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participants already hold 45 per cent of total holdings of 
forint-denominated treasury bills and bonds (Chart 4-8).
The favourable market sentiment was well reflected in the 
developments in government bond market yields as well: 
since end-June yields in the government bond market 
declined gradually, to various extents and with different 
volatilities depending on maturities. At the short end of the 
yield curve, the yield on three-month treasury bills declined 
by nearly 50 basis points, broadly in line with the 
expectations concerning the central bank base rate. The 
strongest decline was observed in the middle of the curve; 
the three-year reference yield fell by some 110 basis points 
to 6.7 per cent. A smaller 60–70 basis point decline was 
observed in the case of longer-term securities. Accordingly, 
the yield on the 10-year Hungarian government bond is at 
around the level of 7.3 per cent (Chart 4-9).
In the money market, FRA quotes, which reflect interest 
rate expectations, also decreased. As a result, currently the 
market is pricing a further gradual decline of the base rate. 
Chart 4-8
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Chart 4-9
development of government securities market reference 
yields
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4.2.1  CredIt CondItIonS of 
Corporate loanS
The interest rate on forint-denominated corporate loans 
smoothed by the three-month moving average increased 
slightly, from 9.7 per cent in April to 9.8 per cent in July 
(Chart 4-10), while the interbank rate (three-month BUBOR) 
declined by 0.1 percentage point. Accordingly, the spread 
on the interbank rate rose from 2.4 percentage points to 2.6 
percentage points (Chart 2). The interest rate level dropped 
in the case of EUR-denominated loans, from 3.8 per cent to 
3.5 per cent, but this was offset by decreasing interbank 
rate (three-month EURIBOR) resulting in flat interest rate 
spread around 2.9 percentage points (Chart 4-11).
Corporate credit conditions were reported to have tightened 
in 2012 Q2. A net 30 per cent of banks8 indicated tightening 
both in the case of large and medium-sized companies as 
well as small and micro companies, which is a higher ratio 
compared to the previous quarter. Based on banks’ responses, 
further tightening of corporate lending conditions is expected 
over the next half year. Respondents cited deteriorating 
economic prospects and industry specific problems as factors 
contributing to tightening. The role of weakening lending 
capacity declined markedly. Moreover, the liquidity situation 
already indicates an easing of credit conditions.
4.2.2  CredIt CondItIonS of 
houSehold loanS
The increase in mortgage lending rates at end-2011 and in 
2012 Q1 came to a halt. In the case of housing loans, the 
annual percentage rate of charge (APR) smoothed by the 
4.2  Credit conditions in the financial 
intermediary system
The lending survey7 draws a mixed picture of lending conditions: in the household segment following broad-based 
tightening some adjustment took place, while tightening continues in the corporate segment. Interest rates on HUF-
denominated corporate loans rose slightly, whereas those on EUR loans declined between April and July 2012. In the 
household segment, the rise in mortgage lending rates came to a halt, but the interest rate is at an extremely high level, 
which is also reflected in low new loan volumes. The real interest rate on one-year government securities declined slightly 
as a result of the continued decrease in government securities yields.
Chart 4-10
Interest rates on corporate loans by denomination*
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Chart 4-11
Interest rate spreads on corporate loans by denomination*
(January 2005−July 2012)
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three-month moving average was around the level of 12 per 
cent between April and July 2012 (Chart 4-12), which 
corresponds to a 5 per cent interest rate spread on the 
BUBOR (Chart 4-13). By contrast, in the case of traditional 
commercial bank transactions (excluding home savings and 
loan associations), the APR declined from 13.5 per cent to 
12.9 per cent, while the interest rate spread was down from 
6.2 per cent to 5.9 per cent. However, these levels can still 
be considered extremely high, which is also reflected in the 
extremely low new loan volumes.
Within consumer loans, the earlier interest rate increase of 
home equity loans stopped at a level of around 15 per cent. 
As a result, the interest rate spread rose from 7.5 
percentage points in April to 7.9 percentage points in July. 
The interest rate on unsecured consumer loans continued to 
decline from 29 per cent in April to 28 per cent in July 2012 
(Chart 4-12), owing primarily to hire purchase loans.
In the case of housing loans, the high interest rate level may 
be somewhat reduced by the state interest rate subsidy 
programme, which provides a gradually declining state 
subsidy for the debtor for five years. The programme was 
amended in mid-July, as the maximum level of the interest 
rate that can be charged on these subsidised loans was 
raised, making the scheme more attractive for the banks 
that had been passive in the first half of the year. As a 
result, the maximum interest rate might be 13 per cent, of 
which the client pays the portion remaining after the 
deduction of the interest rate subsidy for five years, which 
is around 9 per cent in the beginning (in the first year), and 
amounts to around 10–10.5 per cent towards the end of the 
interest rate subsidy period.
In accordance with the expectations presented in the 
previous lending survey, in the case of housing loans 25 per 
cent of banks in net terms, whereas in the case of consumer 
loans 7.5 per cent of them reported that they had eased 
their credit conditions (Chart 4-14). The easing was mainly 
reflected in the higher allowed payment-to-income ratio 
and the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. This represented some 
adjustment of the extensive tightening experienced at end-
2011. At the same time, for 2012 H2 banks expected further 
adjustment only in consumer loans.
Chart 4-12
Changes in credit conditions and factors contributing to 
changes in the corporate segment* 
(APR, January 2005−July 2012)
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Chart 4-13
Smoothed spreads over the 3-month BuBor*
(January 2005−July 2012)
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4.2.3  developMentS In real 
IntereSt rateS
Since the previous Quarterly Report on Inflation, the one-
year real interest rate calculated on the basis of the 
government securities yield continued to decline, from 2.7 
per cent in May 2012 to 2.6 per cent in July (Chart 4-15). The 
change was mainly attributable to the continuing decrease 
in the one-year government securities yield, while inflation 
expectations remained almost unchanged. The real interest 
rate calculated from deposit rates with maturities of up to 
one year remained practically unchanged in the period 
under review and continued to be around 2.3 per cent. The 
real interest rate level remains higher than the average of 
the previous two years, although it can be considered 
historically low.
Chart 4-14
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Chart 4-15
forward-looking real interest rates
(January 2005−July 2012)
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5.1.1  ChanGeS In the eXternal 
BalanCe of hunGary
The external financing capacity of the Hungarian economy 
declined slightly in Q1, but continued to be significant. The 
combined current and capital account surplus was around 
3.5 per cent of GDP (Chart 5-1). Despite the slowdown in 
external economic activity, the surplus of foreign trade 
remained significant, which may have primarily reflected 
the effect of subdued domestic demand. In Q2, based on 
foreign trade data, net exports may have already significantly 
been supported by a pick-up in vehicle production and − as 
indicated by retail sales − the continued decline in 
consumption.
At the same time, a significant adjustment primarily 
affecting current transfers was observed in Q1 in the 
balance of transfers, which is mainly influenced by EU 
transfers. Following the high use of net EU transfers in Q4, 
which exceeded EUR 1.7 billion, domestic agents used only 
EUR 0.7 billion of EU funds in Q1.
The decline in the balance of transfers was partly offset by 
the slight decline in the deficit on the income balance. This 
is primarily attributable to the decrease in interest 
expenditures transferred abroad. In Q2, the deterioration in 
the income account was also a result of the fact that after 
2009 MOL paid dividends again, a part of which was 
transferred to its foreign owners.
The external surplus of the Hungarian economy declined slightly in 2012 Q1, amounting to nearly 3.5 per cent of GDP. The 
decline was primarily attributable to the decrease in the use of EU transfers. By contrast, the indicator calculated from 
the financial account indicated a small financing requirement. In terms of the structure of external financing, the outflow 
of debt type liabilities and the inflow of non-debt type funds continued. A further adjustment of Hungary’s external debt 
indicators was observed in Q1, which was also supported by the appreciation of the exchange rate, in addition to the 
continued outflow of funds. Partially available Q2 data indicate a further increase in the external surplus, in parallel with 
which the outflow of funds may also have continued.
5  external position of the economy
5.1  external balance and financing
Chart 5-1
Changes in external financing capacity*
(seasonally adjusted values; as a proportion of GDP, 2006 Q1−2012 Q1)
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Per cent Per cent
Balance of goods and services
Income balance
Transfer balance
External financing capacity
* Time series are adjusted directly for seasonal effects, thus the sum 
total of external financing capacity does not necessarily correspond to 
the adjusted values of the external financing capacity.
Chart 5-2
external interest balance of selected sectors
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EXTERNAL POSITION OF THE ECONOMy
5.1.2  developMentS In fInanCInG
While, according to the indicator calculated using a top-
down approach and based on real economy data, the 
external surplus of the economy continued to increase in 
Q1, the indicator calculated from (financing) data shown in 
the financial account indicated a minimal financing need. 
Accordingly, the error of the balance of payments was 
significant in Q1, which may also have been attributable to 
the fact that only very limited information is available on 
households’ transactions abroad (Chart 5-3).
The expansion of non-debt type funds (FDI and portfolio 
equity) more than offset the net outflows of debt type 
liabilities. The inflow of non-debt type funds observed in 
recent quarters is mainly related to portfolio investments 
rather than to net foreign direct investments. However, the 
inflow of funds in Q1 no longer resulted from the decline in 
external assets, which had been typical earlier, but the 
amount of shares held by non-residents increased.
The outflow of banks’ funds decelerated in Q1. One of the 
explanations for the slower decline is that most of the fund 
withdrawal related to early repayments (around EUR 4 
billion) had already taken place in the previous quarter. At 
the same time, there was an unfavourable shift in the 
maturity structure: short-term liabilities increased in 
parallel with a decline in long-term debts. Examining the 
other sectors, the net external debt of consolidated general 
government remained practically unchanged (Chart 5-4). 
External debts of the state were reduced by the repayment 
of the IMF-EU loans and the decline in the MNB’s repo 
liabilities. However, the net external debt of the sector 
remained unchanged, as foreign exchange reserves also 
declined by a nearly similar amount. Meanwhile, minor 
withdrawals of funds were experienced in the case of the 
corporate sector (Chart 5-5).
Hungary’s external debt indicators, which are important in 
terms of risk perceptions about the country, continued to 
decline at the beginning of the year. The gross external 
debt-to-GDP ratio and the net external debt sank to 105 per 
cent and 48 per cent, respectively. In addition to the 
outflow of funds, the adjustment was supported by the 
exchange rate as well: the exchange rate of the forint 
appreciated by nearly 10 per cent in Q1.
The continued outflow of foreign funds may contribute to a 
further decline in Hungary’s external debt indicators in Q2. 
In addition to the accelerated decline in banks’ gross debts 
and the repayment of maturing IMF-EU loans, the adjustment 
of the gross external debt may also have been facilitated by 
revaluation effects.
Chart 5-3
Structure of external financing*
(transactions as a proportion of GDP, 2006 Q1−2012 Q1)
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Chart 5-4
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Chart 5-5
Breakdown of net external debt by sectors 
(values as a proportion of GDP, 2006 Q1−2012 Q1)
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The saving position of the Hungarian economy may continue 
to improve in the coming years. The combined current and 
capital account surplus may be around 5 and 7 per cent of 
GDP in 2012 and 2013, respectively (Chart 5-6). The 
increasing trade surplus plays a decisive role in the 
continued improvement in Hungary’s external balance 
position. Despite deteriorating external demand, net 
exports will keep the external surplus high over the entire 
forecast horizon. Both the large automotive investment 
projects and the subdued domestic demand of the economy 
support these developments. At the same time, in 2013 
external demand may fall short of the expectations outlined 
in our previous forecast, pointing to an external financing 
capacity that is lower than our earlier forecast, but still 
remains considerable. 
The improvement in Hungary’s external balance position 
will be moderated by the slow but gradual deterioration 
expected in the income balance in the coming years. At the 
same time, compared to the previous Quarterly Report on 
Inflation, the decline in EUR yields points to a more 
favourable income balance, since future interest 
expenditures transferred abroad may also decline as well. 
EU transfers may contribute significantly to the net financing 
capacity of the country in the coming years as well. 
However, as a result of the lower actual data received, our 
forecast has been revised downwards slightly.
Examining the expected savings developments from the 
side of the sectors, with the private sector’s position 
5.2  forecast for hungary’s external balance 
position
The net external financing capacity of the Hungarian economy may continue to increase in the coming years. The 
improvement in Hungary’s external balance position is attributable to the continuously growing surplus on the balance of 
goods and services as well as to increasing inflows of EU transfers, while the rising deficit on the income balance points 
to a moderation. Automotive investment projects that are launching production may gradually play a decisive role in the 
dynamic expansion of net exports. In addition, restrained domestic demand through subdued imports may also contribute 
to the high trade surplus. Examining the saving positions of the sectors − taking account of a fiscal adjustment that 
assumes the achievement of the deficit target − it can be established that the savings position of general government may 
improve, while the private sector’s projected net financing capacity may become stable at a high level. Within the private 
sector, while households’ net financial savings may decline slightly in the coming years with the disappearance of one-off 
items, financing capacity is expected to continue to increase in the case of companies.
Chart 5-6
Changes in external financing capacity 
(as a proportion of GDP)
−12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
−12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Per centPer cent
Balance of goods and services
Income balance
Transfer balance*
External position (current and capital account)
External position (from financing side)
* The sum of current transfers and the capital account balance.
Quarterly report on inflation • September 2012 61
EXTERNAL POSITION OF THE ECONOMy
stagnating at a high level, the declining general government 
deficit points to an increase in net financing capacity (Chart 
5-7).
In parallel with the disappearance of one-off items and a 
pick-up in lending, households’ net financial savings may 
decline slightly. Households’ consumption-saving decisions 
continue to be considerably influenced by balance sheet 
adjustments due to the high outstanding debt. Although the 
interest rate subsidy programme may stimulate borrowing, 
no significant upswing is expected in lending activity, due 
to the unfavourable prospects for business activity (Chart 
5-8).
The net saving position of the corporate sector may 
continue to increase, which may primarily reflect subdued 
investment activity. The utilisation of EU transfers, which is 
expected to increase, may improve not only the balance of 
transfers but also the financial position of companies.
According to our latest forecast, the external surplus of the 
economy may continue to grow, i.e. the outflow of foreign 
funds may continue. Accordingly, the improvement in the 
external balance may be reflected in the decline in external 
vulnerability indicators as well. The decline in debt 
indicators that are important in terms of the risk perception 
of Hungary may also be supported by a stronger exchange 
rate as well.
Chart 5-7
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5.3.1  GovernMent MeaSureS 
announCed after the puBlICatIon 
of the June ISSue of the 
Quarterly report on InflatIon
In the June issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation, we 
projected accrual-based deficits of 2.7 and 2.4 per cent for 
2012 and 2013, respectively, which slightly exceed the 
deficit target.
There has been no major change in our forecast for 2012. As 
a result of macroeconomic and fiscal developments as well 
as the measures affecting this year, the deficit increased 
slightly, by 0.1 percentage point of GDP, to 2.8 per cent. 
However, the measures announced in the meantime resulted 
in a significant fiscal loosening for 2013. According to our 
calculations, compared to the information base of the June 
issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation, the net deficit 
increasing effect10 of the Government’s measures announced 
in recent months may amount to 1.4 per cent of GDP (Table 
5-1).
The total effect of the job protection action plan is 
estimated to amount to 0.8 per cent of GDP, i.e. the accrual 
based fiscal revenue may decline by this much without 
5.3  fiscal developments
Overall, continued strict fiscal management is expected for 2012; according to our forecast, the deficit will only slightly 
exceed the Government’s target.9 At the same time, the measures announced in the past quarter resulted in a considerable 
loosening in the 2013 fiscal balance. Compared to the budget bill submitted in June and presented in our forecast, 
Parliament may decide on a fiscal stimulus exceeding 1 per cent of GDP. Should the Government fail to offset the 
budgetary effects of the measures, next year’s deficit may be around 3.5–4 per cent of GDP. Since a deterioration in 
balance of this magnitude contrasts with the Government’s commitment to deficit targets and the EU regulations 
concerning fiscal discipline, in our forecast we assumed a hypothetical fiscal adjustment that is consistent with the 
Government’s intentions set out in the Convergence Programme of Hungary. According to our calculations, next year’s 
deficit may be reduced to 2.4 per cent of GDP with a fiscal adjustment equalling 1.4 per cent of GDP. 
9  In our analysis, we assume the cancellation of the free fiscal reserves. 
10  Net deficit effect means that our calculations also take into account the first-round (direct) effects of the measures on the revenues from taxes and 
contributions. At the same time, the net deficit effect does not contain the effects of the so-called second-round fiscal deficit resulting from the 
macroeconomic effects of the measures.
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second-round effects.11 The package intends to support job 
creation in a targeted way by reductions in contributions12 
as well as by the introduction of new tax systems for small- 
and micro-sized enterprises (cash-flow corporate income 
tax on small enterprises and lump-sum tax on entrepreneurs). 
The reductions in contributions are estimated to affect 
590,000–600,000 people. The introduction of the cash-flow 
corporate income tax on small enterprises may affect some 
three-quarters of people employed by the companies that 
meet the conditions announced to date. The lump-sum tax 
on entrepreneurs may affect 175,000 tax-payers. More than 
half of those who are expected to choose this tax are 
entrepreneurs or are subject to corporation tax now; a 
smaller portion of them may come from among those who 
now pay a simplified entrepreneurial tax. Upon estimating 
the deficit increasing effect of the action plan we also took 
account of the savings developing in connection with the 
social contribution tax allowance related to the wage 
compensation.13
Revenue from the financial transaction tax will be much 
lower than what was indicated in the submitted bill. First, 
the agreement concluded with the Banking Association 
maximised the amount of the tax that can be imposed on a 
transaction. Second, tax revenue from treasury turnover is 
overestimated. We do not consider the financial transaction 
tax imposed on the MNB a balance improving measure with 
a permanent effect. Namely, the cost of the tax is expected 
to appear in the MNB’s profit/loss account, adding to the 
loss of the Bank. Accordingly, in a consolidated approach 
the measure fails to improve the fiscal position of the 
budget already in 2013; it can only be considered a 
temporary source of financing. Moreover, in the opinion of 
the European Central Bank and the European Commission 
this tax is incompatible with the EU norms relating to 
monetary policy. In view of the arguments listed above, in 
our forecast we assumed that the MNB’s payment obligation 
will not enter into force. 
The new measures affecting health-care spending will 
improve the balance by a total of 0.1 percentage point of 
GDP compared to our June forecast. Based on the effects 
of the 2012 increase in wages, we took into account higher 
health-care expenditures than the submitted bill already in 
June. The funds for the additional expenditures will be 
provided by revenue raised by the excise tax increase, 
which entails a balance-improving effect. 
table 5-1
estimated effect of the fiscal measures announced after 
the publication of the June issue of the Quarterly report 
on Inflation*
(HUF billion; percentage of GDP)
new measures Bn huf Gdp %
a) Job protection plan
    Targeted tax allowances −99 −0.3
    Lump-sum tax on entrepreneurs −40 −0.1
     Cash-flow corporate income tax on small 
enterprises
−144 −0.5
     Effects on social contribution tax allowance 
related to the wage compensation
40 0.1
total effect on the balance −243 −0.8
B) revenue measures
    Transaction tax −203 −0.7
    Changes in VAT 2 0.0
    Increase in excise duties 47 0.2
    Public health product tax 3 0.0
total effect on the balance −152 −0.5
C) Change in expenditure
    Health-care services 30 0.1
    Change in other expenditure appropriations 39 0.1
     Tax and contribution content of extra 
spending
−25 −0.1
     Investment related to the E-tolls for 
highways
42 0.1
total effect on the balance 86 0.2
d) other effect
    Court decision on concession** 40 0.1
total effect on the balance 40 0.1
total effect (a+B-C+d): −441 −1.4
* In the case of the so-called targeted preferences only the impact 
affecting the competitive sector was taken into account.
** Due to the court decision related to the concession of 
telecommunication, we assume that the concession revenue planned for 
2012 can be realized in 2013.
11  The estimate of the balance effect of the package of measures is very uncertain because it is difficult to estimate the effect of the significant changes 
in the tax and contribution system on the behaviour of companies and employees.
12  The preferences focus on five target groups: the age group of people below 25, the age group of those over 55, the long-term unemployed, unskilled 
labour and those who are returning to the labour market from maternity benefit.
13  For the target groups the new reductions in contributions partly or completely replace the support related to the wage compensation system; the 
expected savings are estimated to amount to HUF 35 billion.
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5.3.2  fISCal path ConSIStent WIth 
the MaCroeConoMIC foreCaSt
The aforementioned significant fiscal loosening is 
inconsistent with our expectation that the Government is 
committed to strict fiscal management and wants to 
achieve its deficit target undertaken in the Convergence 
Programme. Therefore, our macroeconomic forecast is 
based on the assumption that the Government will offset its 
already announced measures that result in fiscal loosening 
with a new package in the near future. In our forecast, we 
assumed a hypothetical package of measures that includes 
only government steps that can be found in the Convergence 
Programme or that comply with the objectives specified 
therein.
With the application of the above mentioned conditions, 
our forecast for 2013 remains unchanged, i.e. the deficit 
will amount to 2.4 per cent of GDP, as it was presented in 
the June issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation. 
However, the composition of the deficit has changed 
slightly because we offset half of the loosening perceived 
on the revenue side with a hypothetical adjustment that 
reduces expenditures.
5.3.3  ChanGeS In the CyClICally 
adJuSted fISCal poSItIon
As a result of the fiscal adjustment that is being implemented 
in 2012, the cyclically adjusted augmented SNA balance, 
which describes the ‘underlying’ fiscal position, will decline 
to below 3 per cent of GDP. With the assumption of the 
hypothetical package, the deficit indicator may continue to 
improve by 2013, approaching 2.5 per cent of GDP (Table 
5-4).
This indicator takes into account how large a balance 
improving effect it may have if tax revenues catch up with 
their medium-term trend estimated by us, and it also 
reflects the fiscal costs currently included in the accounting 
of state-owned companies (e.g. public transport). 
table 5-2
additional impact of the health package on the balance, the 
change compared to the June issue of the Quarterly report 
on Inflation 
(HUF billion; percentage of GDP)
new measures Bn huf Gdp %
1) total change in revenue 48 0.2
    Increase in excise duties 47 0.2
    Public health product tax 3 0.0
    VAT on medical appliances −2 0.0
2) total change in expenditure 20 0.1
    Health-care services 30 0.1
    Tax content of the extra spending −10 0.0
3) total effect on the balance (1−2) 28 0.1
table 5-3
total effect of fiscal and macroeconomic developments on 
the 2013 eSa balance forecast 
(as a percentage of GDP)
Gdp %
Change in net interest expenditure 0.1
Expected compensation for losses for the MNB −0.1
Change in the primary balance (base-year effect, 
macroeffects) 0.0
Total effect on the balance 0.0
table 5-4
General government balance indicators 
(as a percentage of GDP)
2011 2012 2013
ESA-balance* 4.2 −2.8 −2.4
Effect of the hypothetical adjustment** − − 1.4
Augmented SNA-balance −6.0 −3.4 −3.1
Cyclical component (MNB method) −0.4 −0.5 −0.5
Cyclically adjusted augmented SNA-balance −5.7 −2.8 −2.5
* The complete cancellation of the available free reserves was assumed upon the calculation of the balance indicators.
** Assumption of fiscal adjustment which is consistent with the most likely macroeconomic scenario.
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At the same time, cyclically adjusted balance indicators do 
not provide a comprehensive picture of the medium-term 
position of the budget. The effects of numerous measures 
(e.g. earlier actions affecting the pension system) and 
developments (e.g. an unavoidable increase in government 
investment of own financing) that will affect the fiscal 
deficit in the coming years are not reflected in the 
structural balance indicator. Moreover, the expected 
increase in interest expenditures stemming from the 
renewal of current debt beyond the forecast period is also 
not reflected by these indicators. Considering the above 
effects, further balance improving measures may become 
necessary for the fiscal adjustment to be sustainable over 
the medium term.
5.3.4  eXpeCted developMentS In 
the deBt path In the CaSe of a 
fISCal adJuStMent
The government debt-to-GDP ratio calculated at constant 
exchange rates is expected to decline in two years from its 
end-2011 level of 80.8 per cent by almost 2 percentage 
points in 2012-2013, if the budget deficit follows the path 
described above. In addition to the deficit, the rate of 
decline in debt largely depends on the method of financing 
and changes in the exchange rate.
At present, a large amount of financing reserves is available 
for the budget in forint and foreign currency deposits as 
well as in the portfolio taken over from private pension 
funds. If the Government wants to maintain these financing 
reserves, assuming constant exchange rates, the debt can 
decline moderately in 2012 and more significantly in 2013 
− due to the assumed budgetary adjustment − resulting in a 
debt ratio of 79 per cent of GDP by 2013. Using the financing 
reserves for debt reduction might even reduce the debt 
ratio by further 4 percentage points over the forecast 
horizon.
As a result of the high proportion of foreign currency debt, 
the debt ratio is very sensitive to developments in the 
exchange rate of the forint. As indicated earlier as well, 
compared to the level of EUR/HUF 311 at end-2011, each 
appreciation of HUF 10 would result in a decline in debt 
equal to 1.3 per cent of GDP. Accordingly, by end-2012 the 
current exchange rate of EUR/HUF 285 would result in a 77 
per cent debt ratio in 2012, which can be decline to 76 per 
cent of GDP by 2013 (Chart 5-9).
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The consumer price index shows price changes in a representative consumer basket; from a welfare aspect this is the most 
accepted and relevant inflation indicator. Price stability-oriented central banks typically determine their inflation target 
using this indicator. 
In the case of central banks that consider inflation as a primary objective, the focus of monetary policy is typically 
forward-looking: decision-makers react to expected future developments instead of currently available data. The 
underlying reason is that the effect of monetary policy appears in the main macroeconomic variables with a delay; 
typically, it is the strongest after 2–3 quarters. Accordingly, the offsetting of temporary shocks to inflation that do not 
have a material impact on the medium-term inflation outlook would entail a real economy sacrifice that is unnecessary 
in terms of the maintenance of price stability.
Central banks pursuing forward-looking decision-making take into account incoming data to the extent that they contain 
useful information about expected future developments. In the case of the consumer price index, current actual figures 
may reflect the effects of several factors that are temporary in nature or reflect relative price changes that do not have 
a material impact on the medium-term inflation outlook. These components of the price index may be disregarded upon 
the assessment of actual inflationary pressure prevailing in the economy, i.e. upon the evaluation of the underlying 
inflation developments.
Inflation indicators that exclude certain components provide the most information on underlying inflation developments 
if:
•  the changes in the excluded items do not follow a trend, their fluctuations are caused by one-off shocks that broadly offset 
each other over the longer term, i.e. the average price change of the excluded items equals the change in the overall price 
index over the longer term, and
•  the price change of the excluded items is not expected to result in second-round effects in terms of the overall price 
index through becoming embedded in wage and price setting decisions. The more credible the central bank’s 
commitment to low inflation, the lower the chance of the occurrence of second-round effects.
In this case the indicators that exclude noisy/volatile items may be good predictors of expected inflation, reflecting the 
internal stickiness of inflation and the cyclical position of the economy well. In practice, it is difficult to decide which 
components of the consumer price index can clearly be considered noise and do not influence the medium-term inflation 
outlook. The indicators of underlying developments used in central bank practice typically exclude certain items on the basis 
of the statistical characteristics of a given range of products or the components of the price index.14
One of the most widely used indicators is core inflation, which excludes volatile energy and food prices. This indicator is 
based on the consideration that the prices of energy and (unprocessed) food move significantly and often in opposite 
directions within a short period of time. These shifts are often caused by supply type shocks (e.g. price decision of a 
6  Special topics
6.1  underlying inflation developments from  
a monetary policy perspective
14 For more details see Péter bauer (2011), Inflációs trendmutatók, [Inflation trend indicators], MNB-tanulmányok, 91.
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producers’ cartel, extreme weather conditions, etc.) that are not directly related to fundamental economic developments 
and may change direction even over the short run.
It is typical of the indicators of fundamental developments adjusted on a statistical basis that they exclude items on the 
basis of statistical characteristics typical of a given period instead of excluding a pre-determined range of products. For 
example, an indicator like this can be one that excludes the items that show the highest or lowest price changes in a given 
month or products that are repriced the most frequently. The exclusion of the latter products is based on the consideration 
that inflation of products with ‘stickier’ price changes that are repriced less frequently is more forward-looking, and thus 
may provide more information with regard to the future. These indicators may be suitable for excluding from the price 
index the effects of relative price changes that affect the medium-term inflation outlook to a lesser extent, but trigger a 
considerable shift in current actual data.
In cases when the consumer price index is distorted by the effect of government tax measures, several central banks (e.g. 
the Czech National Bank) apply inflation indicators that exclude the effects of indirect taxes (e.g. value added and excise 
type taxes) as operative targets or for communications purposes. In the case of indirect taxes, the source of the shock 
that causes a change in the price level can clearly be identified, in the case of a one-off tax measure a trend-like change 
can be excluded and there is little likelihood of a feed-through of the price level change through corporate cost structures 
and of the evolution of second-round effects. In the cases of frequent changes in indirect taxes, due to the aforementioned 
characteristics, the price indices that exclude taxes may present a good basis for decision makers. However, it is important 
to mention that the exclusion of the effect of indirect taxes is only possible with uncertainty, as eventually it depends on 
the decisions of the price-setting companies what portion of the change in taxes they pass on to the consumers under the 
existing demand conditions. 
evaluation of the indicators of underlying inflation developments in hungary
The MNB uses several indicators to capture underlying inflation developments. The difficulty in selecting the adequate 
indicator of underlying developments is that inflation in Hungary in recent years has been exposed to a series of price 
level shocks, and most of them resulted in increases. If price level shocks that trigger price increases occur with higher 
probability than ones with the opposite sign in the future as well, the exclusion of the items concerned may result in a 
downward bias when measuring underlying inflation developments. It may also be a problem that due to the frequent 
missing of the inflation target, in the case of Hungary it cannot be automatically assumed that the one-off shocks adding 
to the price level of the excluded items do not entail second-round effects.
In addition to the overall consumer price index, Chart 6-1 
depicts alternative indicators that capture underlying 
inflation developments: core inflation, produced by 
excluding the prices of unprocessed food and energy; core 
inflation excluding the effect of indirect taxes; and inflation 
of products whose prices change rarely15 and of the ones 
that are sensitive to demand.16 Inflation of products whose 
prices change rarely shows the price changes of a range of 
products with low price setting frequency, which is able to 
forecast medium-term inflation developments well. The 
indicator of demand sensitive products also excludes 
changes in processed food prices from core inflation 
adjusted for tax changes, which may be justified by the fact 
that price changes of the latter product group largely 
depend on the typically strongly volatile price changes of 
unprocessed food. 
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15 reiff, Á. and J. vÁrHegyi (2012), Sticky Price Inflation Index, an Alternative Core Inflation Measure, mimeo.
16 The latter two indicators also exclude tax changes.
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In terms of forecasting, it is an important issue whether the 
increase in the overall consumer price index observed in 
the recent period can be considered only temporary or 
whether it affects the underlying inflation developments 
and thus the medium-term inflation outlook as well. Based 
on our indicators, it can be established that − apart from 
the price increasing effects of the indirect tax increases 
and of the products with volatile prices − underlying 
inflation developments reached a higher level compared to 
the bottom they hit in 2010 during the crisis. At the same 
time, the surge in the consumer price index observed in 
recent months is not attributable to underlying 
developments. The increase in underlying developments 
took place despite the fact that no pick-up was experienced 
in domestic demand.
From a monetary policy perspective, in addition to the 
dynamics of underlying inflation developments it is also a 
key issue what level of the underlying inflation indicators is 
consistent with the target defined as a 3 per cent increase 
in the overall consumer price index. To answer this question 
it is necessary to determine the typical magnitude of the 
difference between the consumer price index and the 
underlying inflation indicators. Adjusting the target defined 
in the consumer price index for this difference results in a 
hypothetical target measure that may help decide whether 
underlying inflation developments are consistent with price 
stability.
We used international experiences to determine the typical 
level of the aforementioned difference. The band depicted 
in Chart 6-2 shows the adjusted target measure calculated 
with the average difference between HICP17 inflation and 
the indicators that capture inflation of demand sensitive 
products, based on the historical data of EU Member States. 
In the countries under review, average inflation of demand 
sensitive products is typically lower than the change in 
HICP. The difference varies across countries and in time; it 
is usually lower in developed EU countries and higher in the 
countries of the Central and Eastern European region (see 
Chart 6-3). The band in the chart depicts this high 
uncertainty.
Based on our calculations, it can be concluded that although the underlying inflation indicators are significantly lower than 
inflation measured on the basis of the full consumer basket, at present they exceed the level that is consistent with the 
3 per cent inflation target. The increase in underlying inflation may be attributable to the cost increase that affects a 
wider range of products and may partly stem from higher commodity prices, tax measures affecting corporate costs and 
wage increases that exceed productivity growth. However, it also cannot be excluded that the pricing practice of 
companies is changing due to the permanently high level of inflation, and the price-level containing effect of the negative 
cyclical position of the economy is weakening. 
Chart 6-2
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17 Harmonised index of consumer prices calculated according to the standard methodology of Eurostat.
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Subsequent to the outbreak of the financial crisis in the autumn of 2008, Hungary’s economic output fell significantly. 
Gross domestic product continues to lag behind its pre-crisis level; furthermore, the average growth rate has been slower 
over the past years than it used to be. Examining the factors determining output, our analysis assesses the extent to which 
developments in output are cyclical and the extent to which they can be attributed to structural causes, i.e. slowdown in 
potential growth. 
There has been heated debate globally over the impact of the financial crisis on potential output. Central banks aiming 
at price stability also attach high importance to the issue of changes in production potential, because the difference 
between actual and potential output (i.e. the output gap) provides information on inflationary pressure from the demand 
side.
Some analysts argue that, in the wake of the financial crisis, trend output has lowered. This is due, in part, to the eroding 
impact of the crisis on the supply side and, in part, to the fact that the former trend only reflected a pre-crisis bubble 
rather than actual potential output. Lower potential output seems to offer an explanation for a number of puzzles. GDP 
growth is unusually slow in numerous countries (e.g. the US and the euro area) even after 3 to 4 years after the recession. 
Furthermore, inflation has also failed to decline at a rate that a permanently wide negative output gap would justify.
Other economists claim that the root cause of a protracted crisis is demand-side problems that arise from balance sheet 
adjustments made in response to the financial crisis. With their debts repaid, economic agents will consume less and cut 
back on their capital expenditure more heavily for a significant length of time. They do not, however, think that this 
inevitably leads to the erosion of supply potential. The fact that robust disinflation fails to materialise is attributable to 
well anchored inflation expectations and the pass-through of higher energy prices into headline inflation.
In our analysis potential output is defined as output produced through the equilibrium use of all the resources (production 
capacities) available in the economy, i.e. output that is sustainable without triggering an acceleration in inflation.18 Several 
different methods can be used to examine developments in potential output. Besides being popular and relatively simple, 
the production function approach that we have selected also helps measure the growth contribution of the individual 
production factors (labour, capital and productivity). 
In our analysis, first we overview the developments in both the actually employed and potentially employable production 
factors in the period between 1995 and 2012. Subsequently, based on this, we provide an estimate for potential growth.
6.2.1  CapItal StoCk
Similar to countries converging to the most advanced economies, fixed capital formation is the main source of economic 
growth in Hungary as well. Investing into means of production leads to larger production capacity and the adoption of the 
most state-of-the art technologies. For the purpose of this analysis, the amount of capital available for production means 
capital stock in the corporate sector, the underlying reason being that a large part of the capital stock in the government 
6.2  a production function-based estimate of 
the potential growth rate of hungary
18  This definition is similar to that of international institutions. According to the OECD definition, “potential GDP is a level of output that an economy 
can produce at a constant inflation rate”. According to the IMF definition, “representing an economy’s supply side, potential output is the maximum 
output an economy can sustain without generating a rise in inflation”.
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and the household sectors comprises capital goods (infrastructure and real property) that cannot be directly employed in 
production. 
Fixed capital formation in the corporate sector has slowed down remarkably since the outbreak of the crisis (Chart 6-4, 
left panel): significantly outpacing the rate of GDP growth, corporate investment increased by an average annual 6 per 
cent before the crisis; by contrast, it fell by an average annual 7 per cent during the years immediately following the crisis. 
Subdued investment performance is due to several different factors. The bleak domestic and international prospect for 
growth urged corporations to postpone increasing their production capacity in the short run, similar to the early 2000s, 
when global economy underwent a slight recession. In the current financial crisis, banking sector woes have led to a 
significant and permanent drop in lending to corporations, which, in turn, put a brake especially on SME investment. 
Finally, an uncertain macro-economic and institutional environment also urged corporations to put off capital investment 
or cancel it altogether.
Concurrently with lacklustre investment activity, the depletion of the accumulated capital stock is also likely to have 
accelerated. The pre-crisis depreciation rate was an annual 6 to 6.5 per cent derived from disaggregated corporate 
investment data. However, the crisis also triggered a sharp rise in the number of corporate bankruptcies, which is likely 
to have increased the intensity of depletion of the aggregate capital stock. In order to quantify this, we relied on corporate 
tax return data and the Opten bankruptcy database. Having compared the share of the corporations either under a 
bankruptcy proceeding or going out of business before and after the crisis in the capital stock, we found that roughly an 
annual 0.5 percentage point more capital had been disappeared from production in the years following the crisis. Based 
on these calculations, we assume that the rate of depletion of capital was approximately 0.5 percentage point higher, due 
to a higher number of bankruptcies, after the crisis than in the years leading up to it.19
In response to a fall in investment rates and a higher rate of depreciation, the growth rate of the corporate capital stock 
fell significantly. A pre-crisis annual increase of over 4 per cent was followed by a drop to below 1 per cent in the annual 
growth rate of capital after the outbreak of the crisis.
Although there are several factors of uncertainty surrounding our estimates for the capital stock (e.g. the depreciation 
rate, the proportion of the capital affected by bankruptcies and an initial stock of capital), dynamics of our implicit 
Chart 6-4
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19  The secondary market of the means of production in Hungary is underdeveloped in an international comparison (see Report on Financial Stability, 
April 2012), therefore, we assume that the capital held by corporations placed under a bankruptcy proceeding will be phased out of production.
Quarterly report on inflation • September 2012 71
SPECIAL TOPICS
consumption of fixed capital series is very similar to the dynamics suggested by the national accounts data published by 
the Central Statistical Office. Our current estimate reveals that investment can, for the time being, provide the fixed 
assets utilised in the corporate sector as a whole, i.e. the capital stock has grown, albeit modestly, even after the crisis. 
This also holds true in an international comparison (Chart 6-4, right panel): after the crisis, GDP-proportionate net 
investment has declined in most countries, although, except for one country, it has remained in the positive domain 
everywhere. However, certain sectors which have been hit harder by the crisis, e.g. the manufacture of non-metallic 
materials used in the construction industry, have seen their capital stock melt down gradually.
6.2.2  laBour
In this analysis labour input is defined in terms of hours worked, and is expressed as the product of the number of the 
working age population (15 to 74 years of age), the participation rate, the rate of employment (1-unemployment rate) and 
the average weekly hours worked. It is the trend values of the working age population and the other above-listed factors 
that determine the amount of potential labour input.
Population changes have had a negative contribution to potential output for a long time now. Due to the current 
demographic processes, the number of the working age population has been declining consistently since 1994; between 
1995 and 2012 it fell by over 200,000.
This is, however, counterbalanced by a robust rise in the participation rate. The underlying reason for this is that although 
the participation rates of age/sex/education etc specific groups were rather stable, a significant change in their number 
has, overall, raised the rate of participation significantly since 1997.20 This can be attributed to the tightening of the rules 
applied to old-age and disability pensions and a rise in the share of skilled persons as a result of better education over the 
long term (Chart 6-5, left panel). Due to the composition effects discussed above, the participation rate has risen from 
52.2 per cent in 1995 to 56.7 per cent in 2012; nevertheless, it is still low in international comparison.
20  For the purposes of the analysis, trend activity is that part of developments in the participation rate which can be explained by a change in the 
composition of working age population. See: KÁtay, g. and b. nobilis (2009), Driving Forces Behind Changes in the Aggregate Labour Force Participation 
in Hungary, MNB Working Papers, 2009/5.
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Falling unemployment contributed to a rise in the quantity of labour input in production before the early 2000s; however, 
both the actual and equilibrium rates consistent with stable inflation and wage dynamics (NAIRU)21 of unemployment have 
been rising since 2004 (Chart 6-5, right panel). The rise in the NAIRU since 2000s is due to several factors:
•  A shift in demand for skilled labour is faster than the pace of change in the average educational level of the population. 
This is clearly reflected in the fact that there has been a marked rise in the rate of unskilled unemployment since 2005, 
and increase in long-term unemployment has also been experienced primarily in this group.
•  Since the political transition, the geographical distribution of production has changed considerably, to which low-mobility 
labour force has been unable to adjust itself. The flagship sectors of economic growth are concentrated in the central 
region and Transdanubia; the dismantling of the food and textile industries has hit regions in the Alföld adversely. Starting 
in the early 2000s, the divergence between the individual regional unemployment rates reflects regional differences in 
labour demand and supply.
•  In response to an increase in the minimum wage in 2001−2002, the Kaitz index (the ratio of the minimum wage to the 
average wage) rose sharply, and then remained at a consistently high level. An increase in the price of low-skilled labour 
provided another push to demand for skilled labour. Furthermore, the increase in labour taxes between 2003 and 2009 
put a brake on rise in labour demand as a whole, also contributing to higher unemployment. 
•  Finally, the system of welfare benefits did not encourage job-seeking; expenses on labour market programmes (e.g. 
training, job rotation and job sharing) are very low as a proportion of GDP compared with those in OECD countries; 
furthermore, except for public sector employment, such expenses have been dwindling consistently since 2002−2003.
Although, overall, the government measures taken since the crisis do encourage employment, a long-drawn-out crisis may 
amplify the sectoral, educational and geographical differences of labour demand and supply. The likelihood of finding a 
job is lower during a crisis. The long-term unemployed may lose their skills and abilities, which, in turn, carries the risk 
that they will be unable to find employment even when the economy recovers.
While the transformation of the system of social transfers supports a more abundant labour supply, the effects of the 2012 
increase in the minimum wage and the changes to the tax system on labour demand are hard to assess with any degree 
of certainty. Changes to the personal income tax system 
narrow the tax wedge for those in higher income brackets; 
on the other hand, the 2012 increase in the minimum wage 
makes the employment of low-skilled persons even more 
expensive. Over the short term, this can be alleviated 
through wage compensation, and in the long run, through 
tax benefits encouraging the employment of disadvantaged 
groups.
The combined effect of the above conflicting impacts is 
difficult to assess; we assume that, overall, a protracted 
crisis will feed high trend unemployment; the government 
measures aimed at encouraging job-seeking will only be 
able to reduce unemployment gradually.
Finally, developments in the weekly hours worked reduced 
labour input over the entire horizon of the analysis, the 
underlying reason for which is that part-time employment 
has been gaining ground to an increasingly large extent.
21  The non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) is determined with a state-space model, which pegs slowdown/acceleration in inflation 
to developments in the output gap; the latter determines labour market tightness through Okun’s law. See: tótH, M. b. (2010), Measuring the Cyclical 
Position of the Hungarian Economy: a Multivariate Unobserved Components Model, mimeo, MNB.
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Chart 6-6 shows the decomposition of the contribution of the above factors to cumulative changes in the input of the 
hours worked. Based on the chart, it is safe to say that the participation rate increased the number of the hours worked; 
by contrast, average hours worked lowered it. Furthermore, changes in unemployment have made a negative contribution 
to changes in labour input in production since the mid-2000s.
6.2.3  potentIal GroWth
The hardest and most uncertain part of calculating potential growth is determining the share of cyclical and permanent 
losses in the deterioration in productivity experienced during the crisis. 
Having adopted the methodology of the European Commission (see D’Auria et al., 2010)22, we used resource utilisation 
factor calculated by Rácz (2012)23 to filter the cyclical part of the productivity. The resource utilisation factor comprises 
information derived from a number of confidence and resource utilisation indicators and macroeconomic time series 
reflecting cyclical behavioural patterns, and hence may be suitable for identifying whole-economy capacity utilisation. 
Our results suggest that trends in productivity have made a negative contribution to potential growth since 2009. There 
are several different reasons underlying the reduction in productivity:
•  The financial crisis has restrained financial intermediation and hence the financing of production; as a consequence, 
production can only be resumed in a less profitable manner. Furthermore, the drying-up of external funding may hinder 
the remodelling of less profitable production into more profitable operations and the implementation of investment 
aimed at improving productivity.
•  The programmes aimed at encouraging labour market participation have led to a gradual rise in the labour supply of 
low-skilled job-seekers since 2010, which has reduced aggregate productivity. 
•  Compared with the average of the OECD countries, Hungary’s innovative capabilities are weak due, among others, to 
low R&D expenditure, the absence of venture capital, the low penetration of the modern channels of information flow 
(e.g. broadband and wireless Internet and e-government) and the quantitative and qualitative limits of the human 
resources that can participate in R&D.
•  Finally, a lower investment rate has also put a brake on the adoption of the technologies embodied in capital goods, 
which is likely to have led to a setback in measured productivity.
We used the potentially available production factors and trend productivity to determine potential output growth (Chart 
6-7, left panel). Potential output grew by over 3 per cent on average between 1996 and 2007, which was due, almost 
exclusively, to a rise in the capital stock and improved productivity. Concurrently, labour contributed to potential growth 
only to a limited extent, with contribution shuttling between the negative and positive domains. Due to a sharp fall in 
investment in the years immediately following the crisis, the contribution of capital to growth has been very low. Labour 
has had positive contribution since 2009, the underlying reason for which was a higher rate of participation; on the other 
hand, this favourable impact was dampened by a rise in equilibrium unemployment. As a combined outcome of trends in 
the potentially available production factors and productivity, potential growth was approximately 0.5 per cent between 
2010 and 2012.
We have compared our calculations with the European Commission’s estimate for potential growth made in the spring of 
2012 (Chart 6-7, right panel). Similar to our calculations, the European Commission’s estimate also reflects a marked 
slowdown, which started in the second half of the 2000s. Furthermore, its view on growth potential is also similar. The 
Commission’s international comparison also reveals that Hungary’s potential growth has been falling behind the average 
of the Visegrád countries since 2004, and convergence with the euro area came to a halt in 2007 and has made no progress 
ever since. Hungary’s potential growth seems to be approximating the processes of those countries that have been hit by 
the financial crisis relatively hard. 
22  d'auria, f., C. denis, K. HaviK, K. MC Morrow, C. Planas, r. raCiborsKi, w. röger and a. rossi (2012), The Production Function Methodology for Calculating 
Potential Growth Rates and Output Gaps, European Economy, Economic Papers, 420, DG ECFIN, Brussels.
23  rÁCz, o. M. (2012), Using Confidence Indicators for the Assessment of the Cyclical Position of the Economy, MNB Bulletin, June.
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6.2.4  SuMMary
In our analysis we used the production function approach to examine growth contribution and developments in potential 
output in Hungary between 1995 and 2012. Our calculations reveal that before the outbreak of the crisis the main source 
of growth was fixed capital formation and improved productivity; labour contributed to growth only to a limited extent. 
Between 1995 and 2008 the capital stock doubled; in contrast, the input of the hours worked remained unchanged. In the 
years following the crisis, in response to a permanent drop in the investment rate, fixed capital accumulation slowed down 
considerably, and productivity also declined.
As regards potential growth, our calculations show that, in the period under survey, the maximum rate of potential growth 
was around an annual 4 per cent in the early 2000s. Subsequently, the rate of potential growth declined gradually until 
2005; it started to fall significantly in 2006. As a result, by 2007−2008 the annual rate of potential growth had slowed down 
to an annual 1.5 per cent. The crisis had eroded this relatively low potential growth further, as a result of which the annual 
growth rate of potential output was around 0.5 per cent between 2010 and 2012. The immediate underlying reasons for 
low potential growth are slower fixed capital accumulation in response to subdued investment activity and, partly because 
of this, failure to improve productivity. Although potentially available labour input has been on the rise due mainly to 
measures encouraging the rate of participation, its growth contribution is only a few decimal percentage points at best. 
Looking ahead, a pick-up in corporate investment activity and the restoration of productivity are expected to boost growth 
potential. Towards this end, the restoration of the lending capacity of the domestic financial system is also indispensable.
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7  technical annex: decomposition of 
the 2012 and 2013 average inflation 
table 7-1
decomposition of the inflation to overlapping and incoming effect*
effect on CpI in 2012 effect on CpI in 2013
overlapping 
effect
Incoming effect yearly index
overlapping 
effect
Incoming effect yearly index
Administered prices 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.9 1.2
Market prices 0.7 2.0 2.7 0.7 1.9 2.6
Indirect taxes and government 
measures 0.5 1.9 2.4 0.2 0.9 1.2
CpI 1.4 4.4 5.8 1.2 3.7 5.0
* The tables show the decomposition of the yearly average change of the consumer price index. The yearly change is the sum of the so called 
overlapping and incoming effects. The overlapping effect is the part of the yearly index, which can be explained by the preceding year's price changes, 
while the incoming effect reflects the changes in the recent year. We decomposed these indices to the sub-aggregates of the consumer price index; 
and we calculated inflationary effects of the changes in the indirect taxes, the administered prices, and market prices (not administered prices 
excluding indirect tax effects). The figures have been calculated using the technical effect of the VAT hike.
table 7-2
detailed decomposition of our inflation forecast to overlapping and incoming effects*
2012 2013
average 
overlapping 
effect
overlapping 
indirect tax 
effect
average 
incoming 
effect
Incoming 
indirect tax 
effect
yearly
index
average 
overlapping 
effect
overlapping 
indirect tax 
effect
average 
incoming 
effect
Incoming 
indirect tax 
effect
yearly
index
Food −0.4 0.1 4.8 1.2 5.8 1.7 0.0 3.7 0.0 5.4
   non-processed −3.3 0.0 8.1 1.6 6.2 0.6 0.0 4.3 0.0 4.9
   processed 1.2 0.2 3.1 1.0 5.6 2.2 0.0 3.4 0.0 5.7
Traded goods 0.9 0.2 0.6 1.3 2.9 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.4
   durables −0.3 0.0 −1.7 0.8 −1.2 −0.8 0.0 −0.2 0.0 −0.9
   non-durables 1.2 0.2 1.4 1.5 4.4 1.3 0.0 1.1 0.0 2.4
Market services 1.0 0.0 1.7 1.8 4.5 0.6 0.4 2.1 0.8 4.0
Market energy 3.0 0.0 4.2 1.6 9.0 0.1 0.0 2.4 0.0 2.6
Alcohol and tobacco 0.2 2.8 2.3 6.7 12.4 1.7 1.4 3.0 8.8 15.4
Fuel 5.2 1.2 4.8 1.6 13.4 −2.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 2.9
Administered prices 0.6 0.7 2.5 1.2 5.2 1.6 0.2 4.6 0.0 6.4
Consumer price 
index 0.8 0.5 2.5 1.9 5.8 1.0 0.2 2.8 0.9 5.0
Core inflation 0.9 0.5 1.6 2.1 5.2 1.2 0.3 1.9 1.4 4.9
* The tables show the decomposition of the yearly average change of the consumer price index. The yearly change is the sum of the so called 
overlapping and incoming effects. The overlapping effect is the part of the yearly index, which can be explained by the preceding year's price changes, 
while the incoming effect reflects the changes in the recent year. We decomposed these indices to the sub-aggregates of the consumer price index; 
and we calculated inflationary effects of the changes in the indirect taxes, the administered prices, and market prices (not administered prices 
excluding indirect tax effects). The figures have been calculated using the technical effect of the VAT hike.
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All publications of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank on the economy and finance are available on its website at 
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MnB Bulletin / MnB-szemle
http://english.mnb.hu/Root/ENMNB/Kiadvanyok/mnben_mnbszemle
http://english.mnb.hu/Kiadvanyok/mnben_mnbszemle/mnben_szemle_cikkei
In Hungarian and English; published three or four times a year.
The aim of the short articles published in the Bulletin is to provide regular and readily comprehensible information to 
professionals and the public at large about underlying developments in the economy, topical issues and the results of 
research work at the Bank, which are of interest to the public. Private sector participants, university professors and 
students, analysts and other professionals working at central banks and international organisations may find the Bulletin 
an interesting read.
MnB occasional papers / MnB-tanulmányok
http://english.mnb.hu/Kiadvanyok/mnben_muhelytanulmanyok
In Hungarian and/or English; published irregularly.
Economic analyses related to monetary policy decision making at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank are published in the Occasional 
Paper series. The aim of the series is to enhance the transparency of monetary policy. Typically, the papers present the 
results of applied, practical research, review the technical details of projection work and discuss economic issues arising 
during the policy making process.
MnB Working papers
http://english.mnb.hu/Kiadvanyok/mnben_mnbfuzetek
Only in English; published irregularly.
The series presents the results of analytical and research work carried out in the Bank. The papers published in the series 
may be of interest mainly to researchers in academic institutions, central banks and other research centres. Their aim is 
to encourage readers to make comments which the authors can use in their further research work.
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In Hungarian and English; published four times a year.
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Időközi jelentés: Beszámoló az MnB adott negyedévi tevékenységéről (Interim report: report on the MnB’s 
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